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ABSTRACT 
This joint applied project analyzes challenges in the decentralized acquisition 
of law enforcement products and services in the Department of Defense (DOD). The 
main issue is whether the current decentralized structure of DOD law enforcement 
acquisition and methods of collaboration are sufficient to ensure efficient acquisitions. 
The DOD has established defense enterprises as mechanisms to ensure collaboration 
among DOD components to reduce duplication. Examples include, but are not limited 
to, the Defense Security Enterprise and Defense Intelligence Enterprise. However, 
such an enterprise does not exist for DOD law enforcement. Despite the existence of 
defense enterprises, the DOD still duplicates acquisition as DOD components 
acquire products and services independently. The researchers posit this hinders 
opportunities to increase shared services and category management to realize cost 
savings. Using the service acquisition process in the Defense Acquisition Guidebook, 
this research analyzes DOD law enforcement acquisition to determine if increased 
collaboration is needed or whether a central manager is required to eliminate or reduce 
DOD law enforcement acquisition. Ultimately, this research concludes the DOD 
should establish a Defense Law Enforcement Enterprise (DLEE), led by a DOD 
senior official, as a central manager to provide authoritative decision making and 
senior-level governance necessary to compel collaboration between DOD components if 
necessary. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
This joint applied project analyzes the challenges in the decentralized acquisition 
of law enforcement products and services in the Department of Defense (DOD). The main 
issue is whether the current decentralized structure of DOD law enforcement acquisition 
and the current methods of collaboration and coordination is sufficient to ensure effective 
and efficient acquisition. The DOD has established, through DOD policy, the Defense 
Security Enterprise, Defense Intelligence Enterprise, Defense Forensic Enterprise, and the 
Defense Biometrics Enterprise as mechanisms to ensure coordination and collaboration 
among DOD Components as well as reduce overlap and duplication. However, such an 
enterprise does not exist for DOD law enforcement. Despite the above-mentioned 
enterprises, the DOD still duplicates efforts in the area of acquisition as DOD Components 
independently acquire products and services related to enterprises. Additionally, even 
though these enterprises serve as central managers for their respective functional areas, 
standardization is needed to ensure not only effective and efficient acquisitions. They also 
ensure interoperability between DOD components does not occur. This joint applied 
project analyzes law enforcement acquisition practices through the lens of the service 
acquisition process according to the Defense Acquisition Guidebook. In addition, it helps 
determine whether increased coordination among DOD components is needed or whether 
a central manager for DOD law enforcement acquisition is required. Ultimately, the 
conclusion is drawn that the DOD should establish a Defense Law Enforcement Enterprise 
(DLEE) to address what this research determines are issues with collaboration and 
coordination with DOD law enforcement acquisition. The researchers posit that in addition 
to realizing additional opportunities for outsourcing and shared services that currently exist 
in DOD law enforcement, there are opportunities to utilize category management to 
improve buying power and realize cost savings. Additionally, the establishment of a DLEE 
may help to alleviate challenges with the above-mentioned enterprises as they all contain 
areas germane to DOD law enforcement. Since the collaboration and coordination efforts 
of these enterprises do not appear to provide the results for which they were intended, their 
consolidation into a DLEE could provide an enduring, holistic central manager DOD law 
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enforcement as well as provide senior-level governance to necessary to compel 
coordination and serve as the authoritative decision-making authority when successful 
collaboration and coordination between DOD components fail. 
A. BACKGROUND  
1. DOD Law Enforcement Acquisition  
Under its current structure, DOD executes its law enforcement functions in a 
decentralized manner. Due to the decentralized nature of DOD law enforcement, no central 
entity exists to facilitate acquisition for DOD law enforcement organizations. While 
effective coordination and collaboration can mitigate potential issues with decentralization, 
the DOD currently lacks both in law enforcement. The DOD tends to use working groups 
for coordination and collaboration in law enforcement. However, these are not enduring 
working groups and are often created to address a specific matter after which they are 
dissolved, such as the Tri-Service Working Group and Counterintelligence Corporate 
Information Management Working Group. 
In 1995, the Advisory Board on the Investigative Capability of the DOD, hereafter 
referred to as The Board, provided a report to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and 
Congress regarding numerous law enforcement matters within the DOD. According to The 
Board (1995), “the Tri-Service Working Group was formed to identify ways to integrate 
and consolidate operations of Military Criminal Investigative Organizations (MCIOs) to 
save money and accommodate declining end strength targets while maintaining service 
delivery to the DOD. The Working Group determined that the collocation of MCIO fraud 
offices would result in cost savings due to reductions in leasing expenses and payroll. Yet, 
of 19 offices recommended for collocation, only 4 were” consolidated.  
The Counterintelligence Corporate Information Management Working Group, over 
12 months, systematically examined the common functional processes of the DOD 
organizations performing the counterintelligence (CI) mission to identify opportunities for 
improvement (The Board, 1995). According to The Board (1995), the CIM Working Group 
determined that the Army, Navy, and Air Force used different automated data processing 
(ADP) hardware, software, and report writing systems to do the same job. Today, ADP 
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hardware, software, and report writing systems are commonly referred to as a case 
management system (CMS). The  Counterintelligence Corporate Information Management 
Working Group stated “significant efficiencies and potential improvements in CI 
capabilities could be realized within DDD simply by requiring the Army, Navy, and Air 
Force to: use the same CI vocabulary; use the same report writing systems; buy compatible 
computer hardware; develop computer software cooperatively; use a common database 
manager; and train the same.” (The Board, 1995) 
In the report, The Board referenced a Corporate Information Management (CIM) 
working group established by the Inspector General of the DOD (IG DOD) to determine a 
way to integrate information systems of the DOD’s criminal investigation organizations. 
The Board (1995) stated the following in its report regarding the CIM: 
CIM is the term used to describe the [DOD] initiative to modernize and 
standardize [DOD] information management, permit greater integration of 
systems, and reduce system acquisition and software development costs 
over time. The CIM process involves dissecting a specific task, such as 
report-writing, identifying opportunities to improve each step of the task, 
and implementing cost-effective changes, which may include automation, 
to improve the task. 
However, the CIM did not include the non-investigative organizations of the DOD, such 
as military police, in the working group. As demonstrated by Table 1, the DOD still has 
not procured a modernized, standardized, and integrated CMS.  
Table 1. List of Known DOD Law Enforcement Case Management Systems 
NAME OF SYSTEM USERS 
Case Reporting and Information 
Management System (CRIMS) Defense Criminal Investigative Service 
Army Law Enforcement Reporting 
and Tracking System (ALERTS) 
U.S. Army Criminal Investigative Command  
U.S. Army Military Police 
Investigative Information 
Management System (I2MS) Air Force Office of Special Investigations 
Consolidated Law Enforcement 
Operations Center (CLEOC) 
Naval Criminal Investigative Service 
Navy Security Forces 
Marine Corps Criminal Investigative Division 
Marine Corps Military Police 
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Currently, each organization, through its respective military departments, procures 
products and services independent of one another. While Table 1 lists four CMS currently 
in use by DOD investigative organizations, it does not capture all DOD law enforcement 
information systems acquired and sustained by other non-investigative DOD law 
enforcement organizations. Therefore, in addition to the four overlapping systems in Table 
1, other CMS and similar information systems exist throughout the DOD, but the details 
of which are not available to the researchers.  
Each organization duplicates the acquisition and sustainment activities when it 
procures a unique CMS, pre-award, award, and post-award activities are duplicated which 
increases acquisition program and contract management costs. In addition to each 
organization contributing to a DOD-wide problem of inefficient acquisition, each new 
CMS adds to system complexity and the potential for data incompatibility, making it more 
difficult to send, receive or connect information and/or data. For example, the CMS of the 
Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) is not able to send or receive data to or 
from the CMS of the U.S. Army Criminal Investigative Division (USACID). The same 
applies to the CMS of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) and the CMS of 
Air Force Security Forces. The lack of interoperability prevents synergy that could improve 
the effectiveness and efficiency of DOD investigations and other law enforcement 
functions.  
Decentralized acquisition in the DOD is not limited to information systems.  It also 
affects the physical goods the DOD procures. Consumables such as clothing for DOD law 
enforcement personnel, weapons, and other personal protective equipment required to 
ensure the safety of its law enforcement personnel are obtained in a decentralized manner 
via separate military departments. It also prevents the use of consolidated acquisitions and 
category management, shared services, and/or outsourcing has the potential to lower both 
operational and acquisition costs. Centralizing the acquisition of DOD law enforcement 
products and services would enable the DOD to capture both efficiencies and economies 
of scale. 
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2. Potential Impact of Service Acquisition Strategy on DOD Law 
Enforcement 
“The point of the strategy-making process is to choose the best course of action 
from a set of potential options, which means insisting on the development of multiple 
plausible options that are presented equally and without bias” (Meiser, 2017). The DOD 
does this relatively well through its use of service acquisition strategy. The goals of 
virtually any service acquisition are to find and obtain the best possible service(s) for the 
customer at a fair and reasonable price to both the DOD and the contractor. Part of the 
plan(s) for achieving these goals involves identifying existing opportunities to acquire the 
service or identifying alternatives to the service requested that meets or exceeds the 
customer’s requirement(s). Consolidation and centralization have been well established as 
a way to capture economies of scope and scale, particularly for shared services, 
outsourcing, and category management in government and large-scale organizations. The 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) memorandum titled Centralized Mission 
Support Capabilities for the Federal Government (2019) articulated the key role 
centralization played in modernizing the Federal Government and improving mission 
outcomes, provide services, and stewardship of taxpayer dollars. The recommendations 
were substantiated via analysis of the implementation of common standards and shared 
services at International Business Machines (IBM) (Proctor & Gamble, 2011) where 
savings and cost avoidance delivered $9 billion and $900 million, respectively (OMB, 
2019). Similar value in consolidation and specialization can be established through wide 
recognition of the value in outsourcing. The Director of the Defense Information Systems 
Agency (DISA), Lieutenant General (Lt.Gen.) Robert Skinner plans to increase efficiency 
and capture cost savings by embracing the DOD’s push to outsource information 
technology (IT) services to vendors (Eversden, 2021). Lt.Gen. Skinner (Everdsen, 2021) 
describes his rationale:  
Why would the government develop something when there is something 
that’s already out there from a commercial standpoint? Or why would we 
take something that’s commercial and ... bastardize it to the point of it is a 
one-off or it’s very unique, just for the government? 
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The Air Force is also exploring options to address the worldwide pilot shortage by 
outsourcing pilot training using programs that deliver to the same standard of training as 
Air Force training programs (Pawlyck, 2021). In addition, the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) has established the potential for consolidation of category management to 
save the “federal government billions of dollars each year by improving how agencies buy 
common products and services” (DiNapoli, 2021).  
One barrier to the DOD to obtain a better value through its law enforcement 
procurement, aside from decentralization, is the lack of understanding of law 
enforcement’s place within the DOD. Leadership in the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD) and the military departments have failed to recognize the cross-cutting nature of 
DOD law enforcement. Law enforcement is utilized by commanders at all levels to ensure 
good order and discipline as well as provide valuable combat support. Military installation 
commanders utilize it to protect their forces and the families that work and live on their 
installation. The theater security plans of Combatant Commanders (CCDRs), according to 
the Office of the Provost Marshal General (OPMG), often include developing an effective 
local police force and operating in international norms to prevent domestic conflict as well 
as building partner policing and corrections capacity to enhance regional stability (OPMG, 
2016). DOD law enforcement also provides security for infrastructure critical to the DOD 
and investigates crimes that are committed against its personnel, property, programs, and 
operations. As a result, DOD law enforcement is, in many respects, an enterprise service. 
Unlike the Department of Justice (DOJ) where law enforcement is the mission, law 
enforcement in the DOD exists to support the mission of the Department, making law 
enforcement a service utilized by the DOD. Using this logic, the DOD should apply a 
service acquisition strategy—particularly the service acquisition process—to identify what 
it needs to procure and the best method of procurement. However, this cannot and will not 
occur with the current, decentralized structure of DOD law enforcement. Centralization is 
required to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of not only acquisition but the 
performance of law enforcement in the DOD.  
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3. Summary  
This section has presented the background on the challenges associated with the 
acquisition as it relates to law enforcement in the DOD, as well as an existing approach the 
could be utilized by the DOD to make its law enforcement acquisitions and performance 
more effective and efficient. This research will examine how the DOD can employ the 
service acquisition process to eliminate fragmentation and duplication in law enforcement 
acquisition, identify areas of improvement in procurement, realize cost savings, and 
increase the speed of procurement, all while improving the performance of its law 
enforcement functions. By doing so, the DOD will capture economies of scale and lower 
the costs to perform law enforcement and returning additional value to the taxpayer.  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The DOD is a sprawling enterprise in which each organization fulfills a separate 
role in delivering its mission and functions. The structure of the DOD’s law enforcement 
organizations and their functions creates duplication across the DOD that has led to the 
inefficient acquisition and less than optimal return on investment. Misalignment with 
national and defense strategies, inadequate attention and concern by DOD leadership, and 
the underutilization of acquisition as a driver of strategic change, have all contributed to 
the current state of affairs. The DOD’s policy generally does not prevent duplication in the 
acquisition of products and services for DOD law enforcement and the law enforcement 
organizations of the DOD do not have their acquisition authority, law enforcement 
acquisition is dispersed across entities in the military departments that are unfamiliar with 
their requirements. This system creates the opportunity for inefficiencies in law 
enforcement acquisition, making it challenging to achieve efficiencies and cost savings 
through the consolidation and centralization of some functions, sharing or outsourcing 
services, and implementing category management.  
C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The primary objective of this research is to determine the extent to which law 
enforcement in the DOD can be performed with greater effectiveness and efficiency. To 
support this objective, this research will examine DOD strategy documents of law 
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enforcement and the service acquisition process to identify areas of improvement in DOD 
law enforcement acquisition. The examination will also entail a comparison of the law 
enforcement functions between DOD, DOJ, and DHS to identify areas where DOD strategy 
and the service acquisition process intersect.  
The secondary objective of this research focuses on identifying methods to increase 
effectiveness and efficiency in DOD law enforcement acquisition through changes in DOD 
law enforcement structure and functions utilizing the service acquisition process. To this 
end, an examination of similarities and differences in the history of reform in various 
functions of the DOD is examined. A discussion of proposed acquisition reforms for DOD 
law enforcement products and services will occur that also identify the need for 
restructuring DOD law enforcement organizations, responsibilities, and leadership. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Information presented to this point briefly describes how the DOD can benefit from 
reform in its law enforcement structure and functions to make the Department more 
efficient. The following research questions were created to answer research objectives. 
These research questions will direct the course of this research which will conclude in their 
answers provided in Chapter IV as well as the conclusion of this research in Chapter V. 
1. Primary Research Questions 
The acquisition of services in the DOD follows a standard three-phase, seven-step 
process according to the 2013 Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG). According to 
AcqNotes (2021), the service acquisition process starts with a valid mission requirement 
for a service essential for execution. “The process starts with a valid mission requirement 
for a service essential for the execution of an organizations mission. The process continues 
through a planning phase, which develops the foundation for defining your requirement 
and business strategy, and ultimately ends with the delivery and assessment of the services 
provided” (AcqNotes 2021). Therefore, the authors of this research posit that examining 
DOD law enforcement acquisition through the lens of the service acquisition process will 
identify inefficiencies in DOD’s current acquisition practices for DOD law enforcement 
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and subsequently identify avenues to improve both the efficiency and effectiveness of 
DOD law enforcement acquisition.  
First, those responsible for providing and receiving DOD law enforcement 
functions require identification. As a result, a clear understanding of where DOD law 
enforcement fits into national strategy and subsequent DOD strategies is critical. Second, 
an understanding of relevant strategies is required to identify the objectives of DOD law 
enforcement determine DOD law enforcement requirements. 
a. Primary Research Question 1: 
Based on the service acquisition process Step 1 (Form the Team), what 
personnel has knowledge, functions, and authority to reform DOD law 
enforcement acquisition? 
b. Primary Research Question 2: 
Based on the service acquisition process Step 2 (Review Current Strategy), 
what are the current strategies that pertain to DOD law enforcement 
acquisition? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
Strategy is used to determine objectives that in turn are used to create plans to 
achieve those objectives. In addition to identifying objectives, strategies also prioritize 
these objectives which in turn impacts resource allocation for the acquisition of products 
and services through procurement. Therefore, based on the service acquisition process, an 
exploration of existing DOD law enforcement functions and organizations is necessary to 
assist in developing DOD’s law enforcement requirements. This allows well-informed 
market research to shape DOD law enforcement requirements that, in turn, are used to 
develop a plan for acquiring DOD law enforcement products and services more cost-
effectively with increased speed and efficiency. 
a. Secondary Research Question 1: 
Based on the service acquisition process Step 3 (Market Research), what 
does market research reveal about capabilities existing outside the DOD that 
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are available to satisfy the Department’s law enforcement needs while 
reducing acquisition costs? 
b. Secondary Research Question 2: 
Based on the service acquisition process Step 4 (Define Requirements), 
what must the DOD provide to support its own needs and the needs of 
external stakeholders for law enforcement? 
c. Secondary Research Question 3: 
Based on the service acquisition process Step 5 (Develop Strategy) what 
reforms are required to deliver best-value mission performance for DOD 
law enforcement? 
E. PURPOSE/BENEFIT  
It could be easily argued that the DOD is overstaffed and structured into too many 
unique entities to effectively and efficiently fulfill its limited law enforcement 
responsibilities. DOD’s jurisdiction is limited to the performance of law enforcement 
activities to matters that impact the personnel, property, programs, and operations of the 
DOD, by comparison, the DOJ and DHS are not limited to matters that only impact their 
respective executive departments. Fundamental differences in missions and priorities 
between the DOD, DOJ, and DHS result in disparities in the execution of these functions. 
Despite this disparity, DOD has 14 law enforcement entities while the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have a combined total of 
11 law enforcement entities and much broader jurisdictions. One contributing factor to the 
DOD’s inefficient structure and acquisition is the DOD’s division of certain law 
enforcement functions among the military departments and their respective military 
services. 
Some laws limit the DOD’s ability to enforce the law in civilian domains such as 
the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) and other USC statutes. As a result, the DOD provides 
support to civil authorities through a shared services model between agencies. The 
additional use of shared services with civil authorities at the federal and state level has the 
potential to improve acquisition efficiency and reduce the type or quantity of personnel 
required for law enforcement. However, the DOD has shown reticence toward maximizing 
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such approaches by incorrectly utilizing law and DOD policy to simultaneously restrict its 
involvement in certain law enforcement matters. For example, although the text of the PCA 
only applies to the Army and the Air Force, DOD regulations and policies direct that the 
Navy and the Marines are subject to the same restrictions (O’Hara, 2005). This is despite 
various doctrines, policies, and case law that support and allow greater involvement in 
civilian, domestic law enforcement by the DOD. The decentralized nature of the DOD 
adversely impacts the execution of its statutory and mission required law enforcement 
functions through previously discussed instances where coordination and collaboration are 
conspicuously absent as well as the lack of single, dedicated individual, outside of the 
SECDEF with the authority to compel coordination and coordination among DOD law 
enforcement organization when it does not occur voluntarily. The reason for inefficient 
performance and acquisition is surmised by asking one simple question: Who is in charge 
of DOD law enforcement? 
Former Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Robert Gates, in his 2014 memoir titled 
Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, stated there is unparalleled power and resources are 
available to the SECDEF. However, very few SECDEF’s have used their immense power 
to reform the DOD law enforcement structure and acquisition to free resources for the war 
fighters. Case in point, despite recommendations to former SECDEFs from two 1990s 
working groups regarding CMS systems, DOD law enforcement organizations have 
incurred additional costs due to the lack of an integrated CMS. Savings generated from 
more efficient law enforcement acquisitions could be redirected toward additional 
investment in existing warfighter capabilities or generating new capabilities through 
greater investment in research and development. However, without reform championed 
and led by engaged leadership, increased accountability as well as effective and efficient 
performance in the acquisition associated with and the performance of the law enforcement 
in the DOD, will remain an elusive fantasy. It was the personal engagement by the Director 
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that facilitated the restructuring of the FBI 
after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) as previously decentralized 
functions were centralized to improve coordination. Former FBI Director Robert Mueller’s 
belief that centralized management would improve coordination and communication with 
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other federal agencies and increase internal coordination between field offices for 
investigative activities and information sharing (Gulati et al., 2010) drove him to push for 
centralization of much of the FBI’s counterterrorism program.  
The DOD has a history of reform to improve effectiveness and efficiency in many 
support areas with great success. Perhaps the reform effort most relevant to this research is 
the establishment of combat the National Security Agency (NSA)—the first defense 
agency in the DOD. The establishment of the NSA resulted from both the failure of 
numerous working group equivalents, such as boards and committees, as well as significant 
leadership engagement by President Harry Truman. President Truman directed the 
Brownell Commission in 1951 to examine the decline in quality intelligence obtained by 
the NSA’s predecessor, the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA), in the period after 
World War II and into the Korean War. According to Hatch (2003), in describing problems 
with coordination and realizing cost savings, stated: 
After World War II, the Army and Navy cryptologic organizations sought 
to eliminate duplication of effort and surmount budget difficulties by 
forming a cooperative organization, the Joint Operating Plan [JOP]. 
However, the JOP administrator did not have sufficient authority to achieve 
these goals. A later attempt at unification, the Armed Forces Security 
Agency, did well in intelligence production, but failed to achieve the 
savings expected of it. It also failed to bring the Service Cryptologic 
Agencies into closer cooperation. 
To address the above issues as well as issues with intelligence consumer dissatisfaction, 
the Brownell Committee recommended the centralization of what are today the NSA’s 
functions of signals intelligence (SIGINT). The final Brownell Report provided a strong 
indictment of AFSA which failed to centralize military SIGNINT and coordinate with 
civilian agencies such as the FBI and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). As a result of 
these and other failures outside the scope of this research, the Brownell Committee 
recommended the establishment of a single organization to manage the SIGINT activities 
of the DOD. It also recognized that SIGINT is a national asset and recommended the NSA 
also serve as the SIGINT central organization for the entire federal government. Executive 
Order (EO) 12333 states “no other department or agency may engage in signals intelligence 
activities except pursuant to a delegation by the [SECDEF].” NSA also has its acquisition 
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authority and utilizes acquisition pathways geared toward intelligence agencies as Title 50 
of the United States Code (USC) authorizes the Director of the NSA to enter into contracts 
or make grants in any fiscal year based on appropriated funds.  
Poor strategic management, bureaucracy, and inadequate attention to the problem 
have contributed to the DOD’s inability to manage talent, leverage resources, and 
maximize its authority to provide much-needed reform. Since no one person oversees the 
enterprise-wide function of DOD law enforcement, there is both no one accountable for 
the previously mentioned law enforcement acquisition issues and also no advocate for 
department-wide change. In addition to ineffectiveness and inefficiency, the DOD has 
incurs significant costs due to losses in buying power for the procurement of products and 
services. Former Undersecretary of Defense (USD) Frank Kendall introduced the Better 
Buying Power (BBP) initiative in 2014 to capture greater efficiency and productivity in 
defense spending by effectively delivering the warfighting capabilities needed for the 
money available (AcqNotes, 2021). Reforms in DOD law enforcement acquisition can 
contribute to BBP initiative, now in its fourth iteration. There are potential solutions to 
these issues commonly found in the private sector, such as enterprise and shared services. 
While the Department of Commerce (DOC) and the FBI have utilized enterprise and shared 
services to increase efficiency and provide better service delivery, the DOD is slow to adopt 
such approaches.  
F. SCOPE/METHODOLOGY 
Descriptive research will explore DOD law enforcement acquisition and 
performance through the identification, examination, and analysis of relevant strategies and 
policies. This research will utilize the service acquisition process as the foundation for 
analysis. A comparative analysis of the current functions of the DOD’s law enforcement 
organizations and those of the DOJ and DHS will occur in conjunction with a descriptive 
analysis of law enforcement acquisition utilizing the service acquisition process. An 
examination and analysis of this and other information will identify and explain the 
advantages and disadvantages of reforming the DOD law enforcement acquisition based 
on the correlating functions of DOJ and DHS organizations. This will include a discussion 
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of advantages, disadvantages, and barriers to DOD law enforcement acquisition reform, 
both past, and present that are relevant to this research. The intent is to provide insight into 
whether previous reform studies as well as reform discussed in this research, if executed, 
will provide greater effectiveness and efficiency in the DOD that will, in turn, benefit the 
war fighters and other stakeholders. This research will address improvements of acquisition 
and performance that can reduce costs and allow for reinvestment in other areas of the 
DOD to provide insight as to whether reform will lead to greater efficiency. 
G. THESIS STATEMENT 
This research will examine, analyze, and determine challenges related to strategy 
in the execution of the DOD’s law enforcement acquisition and functions. The service 
acquisition process will serve as the basis for analysis through data obtained for this 
research. Additional discussion on the matter will examine avenues for reform that involve 
micro-restructure and macro-restructure approaches with the potential to increase 
effectiveness and efficiency in DOD law enforcement acquisition.  
H. REPORT ORGANIZATION 
Chapter I provided a synopsis of the current challenges in DOD law enforcement 
acquisition and how utilizing the service acquisition strategy as a guide for reform can 
increase both effectiveness and efficiency in law enforcement acquisitions within the DOD. 
Chapter II provides general information on the functions and structure of DOD law 
enforcement and proposes the centralization of DOD law enforcement as a solution to 
acquisition challenges. Further, Chapter II discusses previous and current centralization 
efforts in the DOD that are relevant to the thesis of this research. Chapter III utilizes two 
phases and five steps of the service acquisition process to analyze the data collected and 
examined regarding DOD law enforcement acquisition. This research concludes with 
Chapter IV that, through the analysis from Chapter III, walks through the decision-making 
process for determining if centralization is viable for DOD law enforcement acquisition. 
Chapter IV closes with recommendations that provide avenues for reform in DOD law 
enforcement acquisition utilizing centralization as its foundation. 
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I. SUMMARY   
This chapter reviewed the structure and functions of the DOD’s law enforcement 
as well as challenges that impact acquisition in DOD law enforcement. The problem 
statement posits that due to DOD’s size and the decentralized nature of its acquisitions, 
DOD law enforcement is not able to obtain cost savings and other efficiencies gained 
through centralization that may allow for increased utilization of shared or outsourced 
services as well as category management. The research questions, formed through five of 
the seven steps of the service acquisition process, lay the foundation that for the method of 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Lower budgets and the uncertain national security environment place a premium 
on operational effectiveness and management efficiency (Commission on Roles and 
Missions of the Armed Forces, 1995). Therefore, modern-day reform is critical to efforts 
within the DOD to eliminate or significantly reduce duplication– particularly in the area of 
DOD law enforcement acquisition. The decentralized organizational structure of DOD law 
enforcement prevents coordination and collaboration and presents a significant challenge 
for much-needed DOD law enforcement acquisition reform. However, to begin such 
reform, an understanding of why law enforcement functions exist in the DOD is needed. 
A. LAW ENFORCEMENT FUNCTIONS OF THE DOD 
The DOD needs to perform law enforcement functions related to its personnel, 
property, programs, and operations to ensure their protection and availability for the 
national security of the country. DOD law enforcement functions include enforcing federal 
criminal and civil laws including but not limited to fraud, corruption, embezzlement, theft, 
drugs, computer network intrusions, and other cyber activities affecting or involving DOD 
interests and personnel. The responsibility for and the authority to conduct investigations 
of these crimes are vested, through the SECDEF, in both civilian and military personnel of 
the DOD through Title 10 of the United States (U.S.) Code (USC). 
Military service members, unlike civilians, are subject to both the traditional 
civilian justice system and a separate justice system under military law. The Uniform Code 
of Military Justice (UCMJ) is codified in Chapter 47 in Title 10 of the USC and includes 
offenses either not found in civilian law or classified as lesser offenses under civilian law 
but that the military elevates to a higher degree to maintain the good order and discipline 
of the armed forces. For example, adultery is not a crime under civilian law, but it is under 
military law in the UCMJ. States vary in their interpretation of military law when 
determining if an offense under military law in the UCMJ is a felony or a misdemeanor. 
Since the UCMJ does not explicitly differentiate between felony and misdemeanor crimes, 
the DOD uses policy to classify crimes as misdemeanors or felonies primarily based on the 
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potential sentence imposed for a particular offense. For example, the Manual for Courts-
Martial, the official guide for the military justice system under the UCMJ, aligns offenses 
under the UCMJ with the division between felony and misdemeanor penalties for offenses 
in civilian jurisdictions. This is in contrast to civilian law enforcement agencies, which 
through state and federal law, have clear demarcations between misdemeanors and felonies 
which establishes jurisdiction and aids in resource allocation and determining 
responsibility for certain offenses. For example, Title 18 of the USC titles Crimes and 
Criminal Procedure, as well as most state penal codes explicitly separate felony and 
misdemeanor level offenses.  
Enlisted and officer military servicemembers utilize authority granted by the UCMJ 
to enforce military law as are civilian police officers and investigators of the DOD. By 
contrast, civilian officers, investigators of local and state law enforcement agencies, and 
federal law enforcement personnel outside DOD are not authorized to enforce military law 
under the UCMJ. However, they can exclusively enforce civilian law against military 
members when an offense occurs off a military installation and may do so when an offense 
occurs on a military installation under circumstances such as matters of concurrent 
jurisdiction discussed later in this research. Even in matters of concurrent jurisdiction, the 
DOD may still pursue action under the UCMJ as servicemembers, unlike civilians, are held 
accountable to two justice systems—military and civilian. 
Certain intelligence activities and all acts of terrorism violations of federal criminal 
law, fall under the CI and CT are intelligence functions of the DOD.  These are conducted 
under authority derived from law and implemented through DOD policy. DOD Directive 
(DODD) 5240.02 titled Counterintelligence (2018) defines CI as “information gathered 
and activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, 
other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of 
foreign powers, organizations, or persons or their agents, or international terrorist 
organizations or activities.” CI activities include intelligence analysis, intelligence 
collection, CI investigations, and CI operations. The ultimate goal of these functions is to 
protect DOD personnel, property, programs, and operations from hostile domestic and 
foreign threats.  
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Unlike the CIA and FBI, the DOD tends not to separate CI and CT, predominantly 
fulfilling its CT functions, in a law enforcement sense, through force protection (King & 
Woods, 2009). The DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (2020) by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (JCS), defines “force protection as preventive measures taken to mitigate 
hostile actions against DOD personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, 
and critical information”—very similar to the goals of CI. However, DOD defines 
terrorism as an “unlawful use of violence” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2020, p. 215). 
Additionally, DOD’s policy places its CT functions under the cognizance of the DIA which 
is an intelligence organization. This adds to fragmentation in DOD law enforcement and 
impacts acquisition as program management for CT is overseen. Furthermore, while CT 
functions related to law enforcement are performed by law enforcement organizations, all 
have been funded and managed by the military departments. Additionally, despite being 
the program manager for CT within the DOD and having its acquisition authority, the DIA 
does not serve as the acquisition executive for CT related DOD law enforcement products 
and services.  
B. STRUCTURE OF DOD LAW ENFORCEMENT 
While the SECDEF bears primary responsibility for law enforcement in the DOD, 
it delegates the responsibility for performing law enforcement functions to others in the 
Department—primarily the Secretaries of the military departments. These Secretaries are 
commonly referred to as Service Secretaries because their departments oversee the military 
services within their military departments. The Service Secretaries in turn delegate their 
authority to others within their respective military departments and their military services 
for execution. This is accomplished through Military Criminal Investigative Organizations 
(MCIOs) and military police that are charged with performing law enforcement functions 
on behalf of the SECDEF and the Service Secretaries. The MCIOs primarily conduct law 
enforcement through criminal investigations while the military police conduct law 
enforcement by ensuring compliance with applicable laws and regulations to preserve order 
and safety, primarily on and around military installations. When referred to collectively, 
the MCIOs is described as the Defense Criminal Investigative Organizations (DCIOs).  
20 
Many of the DCIOs are also designated as Military Department Counterintelligence 
Organizations (MDCOs) which, as CI elements of their respective military departments, 
are authorized to conduct CI investigations (DOD, 2018). As defined by the DOD, “a CI 
investigation is a formal investigative activity undertaken to determine whether a particular 
person is acting for or on behalf of a foreign power” (DOD, 2018). While not explicitly 
recognized as a criminal investigation, a CI investigation can result in violations of criminal 
law. As a result, the MCIOs also serve as the MDCO for their respective military 
departments as listed in Table 2. The MCIOs and MDCOs conduct felony-level 
investigations that primarily impact the personnel, property, programs, and operations of 
their respective military departments (authority). Their areas of concentration are primarily 
violations of military law, but also include violations of civilian law impacting their 
military departments (jurisdiction) with certain limitations and exceptions.  
Table 2. DOD Investigative and Counterintelligence Organizations 
 
 
The Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) is designated a DCIO rather 
than an MCIO because it does not fall under the authority of the military department. 
Unlike the MCIOs who are typically limited to their respective military departments, the 
DCIS is the investigative arm of the IG DOD and has jurisdiction across military 
departments. Additionally, when referring to all of the investigative organizations, the 
DCIS is listed as a DCIO along with the MCIOs. The Coast Guard Investigative Service 
(CGIS) is not an MCIO, MDCO, or DCIO because, like the DCIS, it does not fall under a 
military department. While the U.S Coast Guard can fall under the Navy during the war, 
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in times of peace, it is an organization of the DHS. However, CGIS personnel attend the 
same or similar training as DCIO personnel and also conduct investigations into violations 
of military law. 
In addition to MCIOs, MDCOs, and DCIOs, each military department has military 
police officers that are analogous to police officers or deputy sheriffs. While terminology 
differs between the military services, they are colloquially referred to as MPs, an 
abbreviation for military police. MPs ensure the safety and security of the personnel and 
property of their military installations through law enforcement functions that include, but 
are not limited to, traffic enforcement, access control, and the enforcement of military law. 
While MPs are primarily military service members, military services supplement their 
police organizations with civilian officers. For this research, the term MPs will refer to 
both military and civilian police officers. In addition to MPs who perform the 
aforementioned functions, the military departments also have MPs that can perform 
investigations. Again, the terminology differs between military departments, but they are 
colloquially referred to as military police investigators (MPIs) or investigators. They have 
the authority to conduct certain felony and misdemeanor-level investigations within their 
respective military departments. However, their jurisdiction is strictly limited to violations 
of military law and typically restricted to misdemeanor-level offenses. Table 3 provides a 
listing of military police organizations and their respective investigative entities. 
Table 3. Listing of Military Police Organizations 
Organization Name Military Department  
Army Military Police Corps Army Army Military Police Investigators 
Navy Security Force 
Navy Navy Security Force Investigators Marine Corps Military Police 
Marine Corps Criminal Investigative Division 
Air Force Security Forces Air Force Air Force Security Forces Investigators 
 
The DOD is comprised of the three military departments as well as defense agencies 
and defense field activities (DAFAs) that are colloquially referred to as the Fourth Estate 
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within the DOD. Some of the DAFAs also perform law enforcement, but primarily by 
policing rather than investigating, as they perform access control and enforcement of laws 
and regulations on their respective installations. Table 3 lists the law enforcement 
organizations of the defense agencies in the Fourth Estate. 
Table 4. Listing of Defense Agency Police Organizations 
Organization Name Defense Agency 
National Security Agency Police National Security Agency (NSA) 
Defense Logistics Agency Police Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) 
Defense Intelligence Agency Police Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency 
Police 
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency 
(NGA) 
 
Unlike the police organizations of the military departments, the police 
organizations of the defense agencies are comprised exclusively of civilian personnel. 
Their jurisdiction is limited to the area on a military installation their agency occupies—a 
jurisdiction smaller than that of the police organizations of the military departments.  
C. THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL 
During a panel discussion at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in 
2016, former Director of the NSA, Admiral Michael Rogers (Ret.), stated, “the government 
learned the lessons of 9/11 and has integrated the military, intelligence community, and 
law enforcement in ways that well-developed allies have not” (Garamone, 2016). The DHS 
was established post 9/11 through the consolidation of 22 executive branch organizations 
from seven executive branch departments to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency in 
addressing threats to the U.S. homeland. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
(ODNI) was established to provide central management of coordination and tasking within 
the IC. However, to date, the DOD has not made similar reforms in law enforcement as the 
DHS or the FBI of the DOJ as discussed later in this research. 
One of the reasons the DOD was not included in previous intelligence, law 
enforcement, CI, and CT reform efforts may pertain to a cultural issue within the DOD that 
Admiral Rogers describes as misplaced managerial emphasis. According to Garamone 
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(2016), Admiral Rogers stated, when it comes to control and outcomes, that outcomes 
should be the driver as it relates to the key factors of agility and speed to intelligence. 
Admiral Rogers further asks “Could we focus a whole lot less on control and who ‘owns’ 
this? ... Because, we aren’t going to get the speed and agility if we can’t do this in a different 
way” (Garamone, 2016). 
In the discussion of reforms and authorities granted under the Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Jones (2005) states, “the DOD’s proclivity to resist 
control while co-opting national intelligence functions is especially likely to frustrate the 
new authority [of the DHS] to the detriment of overall national security.” As with the 
establishment of the NSA discussed previously in this research, control routinely appears 
as the common theme in resistance to consolidation or centralization efforts despite their 
proven ability to improve effectiveness and efficiency. According to Jones (2005), “with 
the majority of national intelligence assets residing in the DOD, the question is not so much 
whether centralized control over the community will succeed as whether such control will 
be civilian or military.” All DOD efforts to integrate functions considered as operational 
vice administrative appear to consistently result in a model that allows the military 
departments to retain some level of operational control—the NSA and the DIA are prime 
examples of that type of structure. Both organizations fulfill the need for central 
management of their respective intelligence functions to ensure strategic synergy while the 
military departments maintain their capabilities to fulfill their specific tactical needs. The 
geographical and functional Combatant Commands (COCOMs) are similar examples of 
sharing control which allowed for the success of central organizations such as the NSA and 
DIA. While the Combatant Commander (CCDR) has operational control of the personnel 
from the military services that comprise the COCOM, the military departments still 
maintain administrative control of their personnel. Therefore, any proposed reform of law 
enforcement has the potential to face less resistance by the military departments if it allows 
them to maintain some level of control over their personnel.  
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D. SUCCESSES OF INSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN THE DOD 
While some consolidation and centralization efforts were directed by law, such as 
the establishment of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency via the NDAA for FY 
1997 to consolidate military department imagery intelligence into a central organization, 
the vast majority of consolidation and centralization of functions within the DOD was 
initiated and instituted by the DOD itself without Congressional direction via legislation 
or directive from the President such as the establishment of the NSA by President Truman 
via a classified directive. 
After the creation of the National Military Establishment in 1947, a single 
management system was instituted where each military service split the provision of 
common articles among themselves (Williams, 2019). To an extent, this model continues 
to this day through the DOD Executive Agent (EA) model discussed later in this research. 
The previously mentioned provisions included items such as fuel, food, clothing, and spare 
parts for equipment and platforms utilized across the DOD. While the procurement of these 
products was carried out by the military services, the personnel performing these functions 
were largely civilian. In 1961, SECDEF Robert McNamara directed one of many studies 
of the defense acquisition system to reduce the cost of weapon system acquisition and 
eliminate duplication in the purchase of supplies and equipment (Morgan, 1966). The result 
of the 1961 study was the creation of today’s DLA. The mission of the DLA is to provide 
central, integrated management over the procurement and handling of supplies common to 
all the services (Morgan, 1966). Through consolidation and standardization, the DLA 
accomplished the procurement and management of supplies under the single manager 
system while reducing the number of staff in military departments by more than 3,000 
employees (Williams, 2019). Additionally, the consolidation reduced military department 
bureaucracy and standardized supply procedures, delivering efficiencies through the 
consolidation of procurement and central management of common supplies. In its first 
year, the DLA exceeded Secretary McNamara’s goals by realizing $225 million in savings 
(Williams, 2019).  
The creation of the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) is another 
example of reform by SECDEF McNamara. In 1962, Secretary McNamara commissioned 
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what was known as Project 60 whose focus “was to establish uniform field procedures 
covering all contract management functions” (Roman & Smith, 1966). At that time, there 
was significant overlap in what Roman and Smith (1966) defined as “contract 
administration which entailed all those actions which are accomplished in the field for the 
benefit of the government which are necessary to the performance of a contract or in 
support of the buying organization.” Roman and Smith (1966) distinguished between 
contract administration and program management functions. Contract administration from 
a central agency like the DCMA would complement the program managers or buying 
offices of the military departments by providing support services that are military 
department agnostic. This, in turn, would allow the military departments to focus more on 
“contract execution responsibilities such as changes in contract terms relating to scope of 
work, schedule, or technical specifications” (Roman & Smith, 1966). As the customer, the 
military departments were freed to focus on contract management instead of contract 
administration. Project 60 estimated that eliminating the inconsistencies and overlapping 
responsibilities in contract administration by the military departments would result in $11 
million per year in cost savings (Roman & Smith, 1966). A revised study after the 
publication of Project 60 increased the cost savings from consolidated contract 
administration to approximately $19 million per year (Roman & Smith, 1966). Fast 
forward to FY 2020, when the DCMA recovered $591 million through contract actions, 
saved the DOD $29.2 million, and allowed the DOD to avoid costs totaling $2.3 billion 
(DCMA, 2021). The DCMA accomplished these cost savings while administering $5.2 
trillion across over 265,000 contracts. Overall, in “the fiscal year 2020, DCMA saved, 
recovered or avoided $2.9 billion against its an annual $1.4 billion budget. The agency has 
produced a 2:1 or better return for the past five years, averaging a return of $2.75 for every 
dollar invested” (DCMA, 2021). 
E. CURRENT DOD ACQUISITION REFORM EFFORTS FOR DOD LAW 
ENFORCEMENT TO MODEL 
For a long time, the DOD has faced concerns about inefficiencies in the Military 
Health System (MHS). In response to a requirement in the NDAA for FY 2013 for the 
DOD to implement health care reform, the DOD created the Defense Health Agency 
26 
(DHA) which became a Fourth Estate defense agency and was also designated a combat 
support agency—designations the NSA and DIA also have. DHA was established “to 
create a more integrated [MHS] and achieve cost savings at headquarters-level 
organizations by, among other things, streamlining the administrative support for the 
military departments’ respective medical programs” (Farrell, 2019). To achieve the 
previously mentioned objectives, the DHA would “provide administrative support for the 
military departments’ medical programs by [implementing] common clinical [and] 
business processes and combining common shared services” (Farrell, 2019). The DHA was 
also to coordinate the work of the military departments’ Medical Treatment Facilities 
(MTFs) as well as care purchased from the private sector. At the time of its establishment, 
the DHA assumed authority, direction, and control over six MTFs in the National Capitol 
Region, including the well-known Walter Reed National Military Medical Center. “MTFs, 
which include military hospitals, ambulatory care clinics, and dental clinics, are part of the 
direct care system” (Farrell, 2019). Direct care refers to military hospitals and military 
clinics that are known as MTFs. The medical support organizations and health care 
facilities “owned by DOD and managed by the military departments’ respective Surgeons 
General” comprise the direct care system. “In December 2016, Congress expanded the role 
of the DHA by directing the transfer of responsibility for the administration of each MTF 
from the military departments to the DHA” (Farrell, 2019). However, the MHS was still in 
need of additional reform. The second interim report of the Congressional Conference 
Committee report accompanying the final version of NDAA for FY 2017 stated:  
After careful study and deliberation, the conferees conclude that a single 
agency responsible for the administration of all MTFs would best improve 
and sustain operational medical force readiness and the medical readiness 
of the Armed Forces, improve beneficiaries’ access to care and the 
experience of care, improve health outcomes, and lower the total 
management cost of the military health system. (Congressional Conference 
Committee Report, 2017) 
The above statement establishes the value of central management of defense-wide services. 
The NDAA for FY 2017 also divided the administration and operation of the MHS and 
MTFs between the DHA and the military departments. Per the NDAA for FY 2017, the 
“Director of the DHA is responsible for the administration of each military MTF with 
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respect to budgetary matters; health care administration and management; administrative 
policy and procedure; military medical construction, [IT] and any other matters the 
[SECDEF] determines appropriate.” Since the MTFs remain under the military 
departments, military commanders per the NDAA for FY 2017 are “responsible for 
ensuring the readiness of the members of the armed forces at the MTFs furnishing the 
health care and medical treatment” provided by MTFs on behalf of the DHA. As previously 
mentioned in this research, reform models on combat support functions that keep control 
of certain functions and military personnel within the military departments while shifting 
administrative matters to a centralized entity outside the military departments, are the 
preferred method of reform by the DOD as previously discussed with the NSA and the 
DIA. In the final report regarding the implementation of the DHA reform per the NDAA 
for FY 2017, the DOD shifted “management responsibilities for civilian employees and 
contractor personnel performing health care delivery functions and operations” to DHA 
while the military departments maintained responsibility for uniform personnel performing 
such functions and operations. This was a shift from the originally planned Component 
Model where the military departments’ Surgeons General, who are military 
servicemembers, reported to the Director of the DHA who is a civilian.  
The DOD maintains a sprawling retail operation through its commissaries and 
exchanges located around the world. While the establishment of the Defense Commissary 
Agency (DeCA) in 1991 merged all the independent commissaries of the military services, 
the exchanges were not included in the reform. The potential consolidation of DOD’s 
commissaries and exchanges had been examined in 12 studies between 1989 and 2015 that, 
while varied in scope, overwhelmingly recommended some form of consolidation (DOD, 
2019). After a Government Accountability Officer (GAO) review of its analysis, the DOD 
projected a net savings of between $309 million and $739 million of combined 
appropriated and non-appropriated funds over the first five years of consolidation and 
recurring annual savings between $255 million and $457 million per year thereafter (Field, 
2020). DOD commissaries and exchanges contract with a highly overlapping set of vendors 
as do DOD law enforcement entities. This potentially reduces the DOD’s buying power by 
not allowing for price negotiations and discounts based on buying in bulk. A task force 
28 
directed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) and managed by the former 
Chief Management Officer (CMO) of the DOD, conducted a business case analysis that 
recommended category management and highlighted the benefit of mergers. According to 
the task force’s business case analysis, category management reforms include shifting the 
volume of goods purchased between different vendors, reducing the number of brands and 
products on store shelves, and selling more private label products (Field, 2020). Field 
(2020) cited DeCA officials who stated that DeCA implemented category management 
reforms in FY 2017 and DeCA began realizing savings from the reforms in FY 2019, 
totaling approximately $50 million. The task force’s business case analysis also stated 
retailers often pay different costs for identical products, and mergers are an opportunity for 
retailers to compare costs across a larger combined organization and make decisions that 
maximize savings (Field, 2020). Therefore, applying the common place commercial 
business practice of mergers can result in significant savings and more efficient operations. 
Despite the above-mentioned benefits, members of the task force informed the GAO that 
concerns expressed by the military departments of the merger were possibly motivated by 
a general opposition to consolidation. While the GAO could not conclude this was indeed 
the case, it is indicative of a history of resistance to mergers, consolidations, and other 
similar efforts in the DOD. The establishments of the NSA, DLA, and DIA are a few 
examples of reform efforts opposed by the military departments and only made possible 
the direct involvement of OSD-level leaders. 
Reform in the DOD continues to this day but remains centered on the Fourth Estate. 
This demonstrates the Fourth Estate’s ability to deliver value in the DOD through mergers 
and centralization. In 2019, the DEPSECDEF designated the Defense Information Systems 
Agency (DISA) as the single service provider to optimize network capabilities for the 
DAFAs of the Fourth Estate. The Fourth Estate Network Optimization (4ENO) Execution 
Guidance memorandum signed by the DEPSECDEF grants DISA the authority to direct 
the transition into a single service provider model for 14 Fourth Estate DAFAs. “The 
Fourth Estate Network Optimization will modernize the DOD IT architecture, consolidate 
networks, reduce costs, improve business practices and mitigate operational and cyber risk” 
(Kuykendall, 2019). Along with consolidating networks, the effort also is merging 30 help 
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desks into a single service, which improves user experience. Costello and Johnson (2019) 
cite deputy chief of the 4ENO project, Laura Herbertson, who stated “the consolidated 
network will also reduce redundant IT costs.” Currently, DOD law enforcement 
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III. ANALYSIS 
A. DEFENSE LAW ENFORCEMENT AS A SERVICE 
The Defense Acquisition System (DAS) “exists to manage the nation’s investments 
in technologies, programs, and product support necessary to achieve the National Security 
Strategy (NSS) and support the U.S. armed forces” (Defense Acquisition Guidebook 
[DAG], 2013). As discussed later in this research, DOD law enforcement is a program the 
supports the U.S. armed forces. Therefore, this research posits the DOD could utilize the 
principles of the DAS to gauge the effectiveness and efficiency of DOD law enforcement 
functions as well as examine areas of reform for service delivery and procurement. 
The services acquisition strategy, which describes the plan set to achieve the goals 
of service acquisition, “contains sufficient detail to allow senior leadership and the service 
acquisition category decision authority to assess whether the strategy makes good business 
sense, effectively implements laws and policies, and reflects management’s priorities, 
including affordability” (DOD, 2020). Additionally, the service acquisition strategy 
describes the plan to achieve the goals set in the services acquisition policy (DOD, 2020). 
The acquisition of services in the DOD follows a three-phase, seven-step process listed in 
Figure 1 from the DAG (2013).  
 
Figure 1. Seven Steps to Services Acquisition Process. Source: DOD 
INSTRUCTION 5000.74 (2020. p. 5).  
The execute phase and its associated steps are outside the scope of this research and are an 
area of further study.  
32 
1. STEP 1—FORM THE TEAM 
The first step in the service acquisition process involves assembling a group of 
individuals with varying knowledge, functions, and authority to complete the service 
acquisition process. The team members must “understand the requirement, understand how 
the requirement relates to the mission, and be able to put an executable strategy together in 
support of the mission” (DAG, 2013). A multi-functional team (MFT) is a “team composed 
of representatives from appropriate functional disciplines working together to create 
successful acquisition of services, identify and resolve issues, and make sound and timely 
recommendations to facilitate decision-making” (DOD, 2020). Table 5 identifies potential 
members of the MFT to complete the steps in the DOD law enforcement service acquisition 
process based on component and military department. 
Table 5. Law Enforcement Service Acquisition Multi-functional Team 
OSD ARMY NAVY AIR FORCE 
Inspector General of 
the Department of 
Defense 
Secretary of the 
Army Secretary of the Navy 




































Currently, the DOD’s law enforcement functions are executed at varying levels 
within the Department as evidenced by the diversity of position and affiliation of the 
members listed in the above table. The DOD’s law enforcement functions and related 
intelligence functions are executed centrally through the OSD as well as in a decentralized 
manner through the Services. Therefore, the MFT is comprised of individuals from each 
of these entities.  
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a. Roles of MFT members 
The proposed MFT for DOD law enforcement acquisition has four roles with a total 
of 17 team members. This appears to be a fairly large and senior team of individuals as all 
team members fall into one of these categories: presidentially appointed and Senate-
confirmed; presidentially appointed; general and flag officers; and members of the Senior 
Executive Service (SES). The numerical composition of an MFT is not specified in any 
policy and the roles of each team member are not defined by rank. In an MFT, members 
serve various roles in the service acquisition process. Table 6 below lists members of the 
MFT for the DOD’s law enforcement service acquisition process based on their respective 
team roles.  








of Defense for 
Intelligence and 
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The roles of those determined to be part of the MFT for the acquisition of law enforcement 
functions are defined by position as described in Table 7 per DODD 5000.74 titled Defense 
Acquisition of Services (DOD, 2020). 
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Table 7. Definitions of DOD Law Enforcement Service MFT Roles. 
Source: DOD (2020).  
Decision Authority 
“The individual responsible for ensuring a proposed services 
acquisition is consistent with DOD’s policies, procedures, and best 
practices guidelines for the acquisition of services through approval of 
the acquisition strategy.” 
Requiring Activity 
“The organization charged with meeting a mission and delivering 
requirements. The requiring activity is responsible for obtaining 
funding or developing the program objective memorandum. The 
requiring activity may also be the organizational unit that submits a 
written requirement or statement of need for services required by a 
contract. The requiring activity is responsible for delivering the services 
to meet the mission if a contract is not in effect.” 
Functional Leader “Serves as the subject matter expert for the functional and competency area.” 
 
The MFT concept omits some personnel that is the stakeholders in DOD law enforcement 
but do not have acquisition or functional roles. For example, the SECDEF and 
DEPSECDEF are not positioned one would associate with being a part of an MFT for DOD 
law enforcement services. However, the law enforcement functions of the DOD are 
performed under the authority of the SECDEF while budget formulation and the day-to-
day operations of the DOD are performed by the DEPSECFEF. 
While there are many other roles for members of this type of MFT, the roles listed 
above the most applicable to an MFT dedicated to obtaining law enforcement services for 
the DOD as they have the positional authority needed to change DOD law enforcement 
acquisition, are a consumer of DOD law enforcement services, or have the technical 
competency in law enforcement needed to advise those with decision-making authority. 
Each role and team member’s assignment to a role is discussed in this research based on 
the authority, function, or knowledge of each team member. The team members discussed 
below all possess authorities or capabilities that are relevant to DOD law enforcement 
acquisition. Therefore, their inclusion in the MFT is necessary for any reform in DOD law 
enforcement acquisition to occur.  
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b. Decision Authority 
The Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, abbreviated as 
USD(A&S), is the chief acquisition official in the DOD and serves as the principal advisor 
to the SECDEF on acquisition matters. Since the acquisition of law enforcement services 
and the products associated with the acquisition will span the entire DOD, the USD(A&S) 
is an essential MFT member. Additionally, the USD(A&S) oversees the DLA which has 
its policing organization to protect the property and personnel on DLA installations 
authority delegated from the SECDEF. According to the NDAA for FY 2017, the 
USD(A&S) is responsible for “establishing policies on, and supervising, all elements of 
the Department relating to acquisition.” In supervising the DAS, the USD(A&S) also has 
the authority to oversee the requiring activities by directing the Service Secretaries of the 
DOD and OSD Components Heads in the exercise of acquisition and sustainment functions 
(DOD, 2020). Therefore, the USD(A&S) is the decision authority for law enforcement 
acquisition based on the service acquisition process. The Undersecretary of Defense for 
Intelligence and Security, abbreviated as USD(I&S), is also a decision authority for DOD 
law enforcement as DOD policy in DODD 5143.01 titled Undersecretary of Defense for 
Intelligence and Security (DOD, 2020) authorizes the USD(I&S) to exercise acquisition 
authority, as delegated by the USD(A&S), Director of National Intelligence (DNI), or 
another appropriate official, for intelligence, CI, and security technologies, systems, and 
equipment. Additionally, the USD(I&S) oversees the NSA, DIA, and NGA which both 
maintain their own policing organizations to protect the property and personnel on NSA, 
DIA and NGA installations through delegated authority from the SECDEF.  
c. Requiring Activities 
Per DOD policy under DODD 5000.74 titled Defense Acquisition of Services, “a 
requiring activity is the organization charged with meeting a mission and delivering 
requirements; obtaining funding or developing the program objective memorandum 
(POM); and delivering the services to meet the mission” (DOD, 2020). As previously 
discussed in this research, the SECDEF, IG DOD, Service Secretaries, and others are 
required by law and DOD policy to perform law enforcement functions and therefore must 
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deliver law enforcement as a service to support armed forces. Additionally, these entities 
are responsible for generating the budgets, which are completed via POM, for their 
respective organizations of which law enforcement is required to function. The requiring 
activities of the MFT are the Service Secretaries, IG DOD, and the Director of 
Administration and Management (DA&M).  
The Services are also responsible for ensuring their forces are properly resourced 
in terms of manpower, training, and equipment for utilization by the CCDRs. Title 10 of 
the USC requires each Service Secretary to fulfill the current and future operational 
requirements of the unified and specified COCOMs. This includes providing law 
enforcement services to the CCDR to perform a variety of functions that include, but are 
not limited to those in the CCDR’s theater security plan. When those forces are not assigned 
to a COCOM, they’re utilized to fulfill the Service Secretaries’ responsibility, delegated 
from the SECDEF and required by law under Title 10 of the USC, to ensure the protection 
of property and personnel on their military installations.  
The IG DOD, per DODD 5106.01 titled Inspector General of the Department of 
Defense (DOD, 2020), serves “as the principal advisor to the [SECDEF] on all audit and 
criminal investigative matters and for matters relating to the prevention and detection of 
fraud, waste, and abuse in the programs and operations of the DOD.”  
The DA&M, per DODD 5105.53 titled Director of Administration and 
Management (DOD, 2008), executes a hierarchy of responsibilities in support of the 
SECDEF and DEPSECDEF; the DOD; the OSD; the DAFAs; and the Pentagon (DOD, 
2008). These responsibilities include, but are not limited to, antiterrorism, force protection, 
security, and law enforcement for the personnel, facilities, and infrastructure the DA&M 
provides policy, oversight, direction, and control. The D&AM fulfills its law enforcement 
requirements through the Pentagon Force Protection Agency (PFPA) for which the DA&M 
exercises authority, direction, and control.  
d. Functional Leaders 
The functional leaders are the heads of each law enforcement and related 
intelligence entity across the DOD. They are all the highest-ranking advisors to their 
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respective superiors across a wide spectrum of law enforcement services that support their 
military departments and defense agencies. Additionally, functional leaders “articulate 
experience standards in terms of activities or types of experience reflective of the 
competencies and proficiency required for the level” (DOD, 2019).  
Each functional leader is overseen by the head of a requiring activity. However, as 
their titles suggest, the heads of requiring activities are responsible for more than law 
enforcement, therefore, the attention and concern given to their respective law enforcement 
organizations is limited.  
2. STEP 2—REVIEW CURRENT STRATEGY  
Former Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter stated in his book, Inside the Five-Sided 
Box: Lessons from a Lifetime of Leadership in the Pentagon (2019), that “unfortunately 
much of the strategic thinking the Pentagon has engaged in over recent decades has been 
increasingly stale and arid.” Without clear, relevant direction through an up-to-date 
strategy, organizations are unaware of how they need to reform to meet changing 
objectives. This applies to DOD law enforcement. Currently, there is no DOD-wide 
strategy for law enforcement operations. Which in turn means there is no coherent, unified 
strategy to execute its functions and acquire the related products and services for law 
enforcement? However, the DOD is also guided by other strategies that rely on a preceding 
strategy or strategies as discussed in this chapter. 
In the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities 
(2013) prepared by the OSD, the DOD elaborates on homeland defense and civil authority 
support, which the Department considers a core mission, despite neither listing it as such 
in the NDS. The DOD’s prioritization of these three missions is aligned and consistent with 
the primary purpose and mission of the DOD. Figure 2 below outlines the DOD’s priorities 
for three missions from the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil 
Authorities (DOD, 2013). Despite the DOD considering homeland security as one of its 
core missions, homeland security is not explicitly listed in the table above, but rather is 
merged with homeland defense. This is in line with Defense Support of Civil Authorities 
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(JCS, 2018) which states DOD priorities, in order, are homeland defense, force protection, 
mission assurance, and DSCA response.  
 
Figure 2. DOD Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities 
Missions, Objectives, and Core Capabilities. Source: Joint Publication 
3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (2018).  
By including force protection in its DCSA mission, the DOD reaffirms its support 
role in protecting its personnel, resources, and facilities. In essence, the DOD’s preferred 
method for protecting its forces and assets is through using the Department’s resources to 
support other agencies in the performance of their duties to delivers mission assurance. In 
short, mission assurance is the protection of the Department’s mission-essential functions 
which, according to the DOD’s Mission Assurance Strategy (2012), includes force 
projection, warfighting, and sustainment capabilities. This is synonymous with shared 
services in acquisition parlance. 
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3. STEP 3—MARKET RESEARCH 
The purpose of market research is to “gather and analyze information about the 
capabilities within the market to satisfy the agency needs” (DAG, 2013). This is a critical 
step in the acquisition process as it is vital to subsequent steps in the process—Define 
Requirements and Develop Acquisition Strategy. This research will examine how the 
utilization of intra-agency and interdepartmental shared services can provide for more 
effective and efficient execution of law enforcement services as well as the acquisition of 
related products and services.  
The DOD must conduct market research to identify responsible sources for 
fulfilling requirements for its functions which may reside either inside or 
outside the Department. Even though a source may reside inside the 
Department, it still requires examination through market research to 
determine if it is a responsible source. The Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR) defines a responsible source as an entity that meets the standards in 
FAR Part 9.104-1 (2021), General Standards. Turley (2019) summarizes the 
FAR’s standards for a responsible source as one that adheres to the below 
standards: 
• The required financial, technical, production, and operational resources 
to perform; 
• Adequate experience and a satisfactory record of both performance and 
business ethics;  
• The necessary management, organizational, and operational controls to 
ensure safety, quality, and other critical aspects of performance  
Since the DOD must properly manage and leverage its resources for its defense mission, 
the DOD must prioritize those functions that contribute directly to that mission. Law 
enforcement in the DOD does not directly contribute to that mission. Rather, it supports 
the mission indirectly through a variety of support services provided by both military and 
civilian personnel. Therefore, the DOD must realize that it may not be a responsible source, 
based on the criteria above, to fulfill all of its requirements for law enforcement. This may 
seem counterintuitive given the fact the DOD has its organic capabilities; almost in 
excessive quantities in terms of numbers of organizations when compared to the DOJ and 
DHS. However, quantity does not always equal or correlate to quality. While the DOD has 
significant quantity, one area the DOD must consider is economies of scale—whether the 
DOD already has them or whether it can achieve them through law enforcement acquisition 
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reform. The latter, based on the DOD’s strategic approach to law enforcement, seems 
unlikely. Therefore, conducting market research to identify the potential for intra-
government shared services and interdepartmental shared services is necessary. 
Additionally, identification of those services is required to accurately define the 
requirements for DOD law enforcement which in turn impacts how it will develop its 
strategy to acquire products and services. 
The former OCMO stated in the FY 2021 Annual Performance Plan & FY 19 
Annual Performance Report (2020) “it is the DOD’s responsibility to deliver optimized 
enterprise business operations and shared services to assure the successful implementation 
of the NDS across the Department.” While the aforementioned performance plan pertains 
to utilizing shared services within the Department, intra-agency shared services are a tool 
the DOD already utilizes to increase mission assurance. In the area of law enforcement, 
there are federal, state, and local agencies operating at scale the DOD utilizes to accomplish 
some of its required functions. 
a. Intra-agency Shared Services 
Integration is the key to intra-agency shared services. Integration in government 
refers to “the coordination of working arrangements where multiple departments or public 
sector organizations are involved in delivering a public service or program” (National 
Audit Office, 2013). Previous commonalities between the government and commercial 
businesses are evident in the realm of integration. Terms such as horizontal integration and 
vertical integration are common in the commercial business lexicon where both are used 
to increase value. While these business practices can apply to government, strategic 
integration is most relevant to intra-agency shared services. Strategic integration applies “a 
coordinated approach across government, for example, cross-cutting mechanisms such as 
shared government-wide objectives or central support for common functions” (National 
Audit Office, 2013). The form of strategic integration most relevant to this research is 
complex strategic integration—one of five different types of strategic integration in a 
proposed framework by Burgelman and Doz (2001). “Complex strategic integration 
involves the discovery and creation of new business opportunities that combine resources 
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from multiple units within the company (each with its particular perspective and vested 
interests) in order to extend the corporate strategy in new directions” (Burgelman & Doz, 
2001). This form of strategic integration provides the maximum amount of scope and reach 
as it can integrate contributions from external partners. This is at the heart of intra-agency 
shared services within the government as it is important for enabling the integration of 
services to work effectively.  
The proceeding sections will list current areas of intra-agency shared services that 
exist outside the DOD between the DOJ, DHS, and local law enforcement agencies. The 
discussion around shared services will center on areas where the DOD currently uses 
shared services to take greater advantage of economies of scale these entities possess. An 
intra-agency shared services model that capitalizes on DOJ, DHS, and local law 
enforcement resources is one avenue for addressing the DOD’s law enforcement 
requirements. Discussion of greater utilization of shared services within the Department 
will also occur. Taking a market research approach to this discussion, this research will 
identify entities that exist in the Department that, through their economies of scale, could 
significantly add to their value propositions as well improve effectiveness and efficiency.  
b. Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security 
To an extent, the DOD is already engaged in an intra-agency shared service for 
force protection through its support of DOJ organizations such as the FBI and Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA). Table 9 below lists existing intra-agency shared 






Table 8. Task Force Memberships of DOD Law Enforcement 
TASK FORCE LEAD AGENCY DESCRIPTION 
Joint Terrorism Task Force 
(JTTF) FBI 
Combined resources of federal, 
state, and local law 
enforcement in terrorism 
investigations 
Counterintelligence Task Force 
(CITF) DNI-FBI 
“Ensuring integrity in 
government-funded programs 
and defeating economic 
espionage and theft of trade 
secrets” (DOJ, 2020) 
 





cyber threat investigations in 
the local community through 
information sharing, incident 
response, and joint 
enforcement and intelligence 
actions” (FBI, n.d.) 
High Intensity Drug Trafficking 
Areas (HIDTA) DEA 
“Provides assistance to federal, 
state, local, and tribal law 
enforcement agencies 
operating in areas determined 
to be critical drug-trafficking 
regions of the U.S.” (DEA, 
n.d.) 
Project Shield America Immigration & Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
“Industry and academia 
outreach program designed to 
seek the partnership in 
preventing the illegal 
procurement of military items 
and controlled dual-use 
commodities, technology and 
technical data” (ICE, 2021) 
 
The DOJ Office of Justice Programs (DOJ Website, 2021) DOJ cites the advantages 
of human trafficking task forces, one of the advantages cited by the Office of Justice 
Programs is true for all task forces in regard to shared services—leveraging resources. It 
provides the following example of how task force members leverage the resources of other 
members in a human trafficking task force: 
For example, one victim service provider may offer housing for female 
victims of human trafficking but lack the capacity to house men or families. 
One victim service provider may be able to provide broad social services 
and case management, but not legal services related to immigration status 
or family law matters—both routine needs of trafficking victims. While a 
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local law enforcement agency has immediate response capabilities, it may 
lack investigative resources that require coordination with federal law 
enforcement agencies. (Office of Justice Programs, para 4) 
In the example above, one task force member offers housing to victims. It is reasonable to 
assume, this task force member’s agency has victim housing at its mission or a core 
competency and is therefore funded and staffed accordingly. As a result, task force 
members who do not have housing capabilities or are not sufficiently funded or staffed to 
provide victim housing, utilize their task force partners’ resources to accomplish the 
mission. Therefore, the task force model is extremely beneficial to the DOD for law 
enforcement as it supports both the DCSA strategy as well the mission assurance strategy 
of the Department. Additionally, this allows the DOD to take advantage of organizations 
that are already operating at scale and have a competitive advantage associated with a 
task(s) undertaken by a task force. For example, according to the FBI’s website (n.d.), the 
agency’s priorities are the following: 
• Protect the U.S. from terrorist attack; 
• Protect the U.S. against foreign intelligence, espionage, and cyber 
operations;  
• Combat significant cyber-criminal activity; and 
• Combat public corruption at all levels 
The listing of the FBI’s priorities demonstrates that CT, CI, and Cyber are its top priorities. 
While the DOD also has a vested interest in these areas from force protection, critical 
technology protection, and military readiness standpoint, it is not prioritized in the same 
manner and is therefore not resourced in the same manner as the FBI. The FBI’s authorities 
are aligned with that prioritization as federal law, EOs, and various presidentially issued 
directives designate the FBI as the lead agency for those functions; unlike the DOD who is 
not the lead agency for any federal law enforcement function except for the enforcement 
of the UCMJ. Additionally, the FBI website (n.d.) listed the FBI has over 35,000 employees 
in its 56 domestic field offices as well as its 91 attaché offices and sub-offices in U.S. 
embassies and U.S. consulates across 75 countries worldwide. Its enacted budget for FY 
2021 is approximately 9.7 billion dollars which included an increase in funding to enhance 
CI capabilities among others. The same holds for the DEA and ICE who are also designated 
by law as the lead agencies over the task their task forces. The FY20 enacted budget for 
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the DEA was approximately $3.7 billion and its workforce is comprised of approximately 
10,000 personnel. The enacted FY20 budget for ICE was approximately 9.3 billion dollars 
with a workforce of approximately 24,000 personnel. Therefore, the FBI, DEA, and ICE 
have a significant competitive advantage in resources and experience that allow them to 
operate at scale in their respective functional areas of law enforcement. As a result, the 
DOD would be best served by sharing in these economies of scale by utilizing an intra-
agency shared services approach to fulfill its force protection mission in a domestic 
capacity.  
c. Local Law Enforcement Agencies 
Utilizing shared services with local law enforcement agencies is an area of 
expansion the DOD should consider in its shared services approach through strategic 
integration. While some MCIOs adopt a form of shared services with local law 
enforcement, it appears to be ad hoc and varies by MCIO and location. This is an area of 
improvement for the DOD as more consistent and standardized utilization of shared 
services with local law enforcement agencies will allow the Department to take greater 
advantage of these agencies’ economies of scale. This will also allow the DOD to re-
evaluate its force structure and its supporting civilian personnel structure in locations where 
increase shared services with local law enforcement can occur. Increasing shared services 
with local law enforcement, while primarily associated with manpower and physical assets 
of those agencies, also requires acquisition changes for the procurement of services from 
local enforcement agencies. 
The vast majority of military installations in the U.S. are under concurrent 
jurisdiction. If the installation has concurrent jurisdiction, state authorities may assume 
jurisdiction and prosecute the offender (Gilligan, 1999). In essence, local law enforcement 
agencies can assume control of an incident on a military installation that involves both 
military and civilian personnel. As previously discussed in this research, military personnel 
are subject to a civilian justice system (state and federal law) as well as the military justice 
system (UCMJ). Therefore, an assault that occurs on a military installation with concurrent 
jurisdiction can be assumed by a local law enforcement agency for investigation and 
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prosecution under state law. However, this does not interfere with the military justice 
system as the military member may still be held accountable under the UCMJ. If the service 
member is investigated, but not prosecuted in state court, the military can still utilize the 
UCMJ to adjudicate the service member for the alleged offense. However, the military is 
aided in this process by utilizing the investigative products generated by the local law 
enforcement agency. Depending on the scope and quality of the local law enforcement 
agency’s investigation, the military may have sufficient evidence to move forward with 
administrative or criminal proceedings against the alleged offender; thereby conserving its 
limited law enforcement resources in alignment with mission assurance. While the 
utilization of local law enforcement agencies to assume control over investigations or other 
policing functions is feasible, it is bound to face resistance from both sides. Military 
commanders are reticent to surrender control of matters that occur on their installations or 
that affect their personnel, while local law enforcement agencies may resist due to 
manpower issues or a desire to remain removed from investigations involving military 
personnel. Local law enforcement agencies, despite having more personnel and equipment 
to respond quickly to the incident, may want to conserve their resources. Despite this, local 
agencies typically want to ensure their involvement in incidents that become a high-profile 
matter such as an active shooter event. The previous statement does not imply that local 
law enforcement agencies are apathetic to all other forms of crime that are not active 
shooters or similarly high-profile incidents. Rather, in a focus on mission assurance, local 
law enforcement agencies may prefer to utilize their limited resources—personnel and 
equipment—for incidents that are better suited for their utilization.  
Despite the above-mentioned challenges in increasing shared services with local 
law enforcement agencies, a format for such a model already exists. Through its JTTFs, 
the FBI routinely pays overtime expenses for task force officers assigned to a JTTF from a 
local law enforcement agency and provides them with equipment from the FBI inventory 
that local law enforcement agencies may not possess—free of charge. The Code of Federal 
Regulation (CFR) through 32 CFR § 635.20 titled Establishing Memoranda of 
Understanding (2012) authorizes installation commanders “to contract for local, state, or 
federal law enforcement services (enforcement of civil and criminal laws of the state) from 
46 
civilian police departments.” Similar to the FBI, the DOD can provide compensation to 
local law enforcement agencies to support the Department executing its law enforcement 
functions through investigation of reported criminal offenses or other policing matters that 
occur on or around military installations. The DOD could create its task force with local 
law enforcement agencies adjacent to military installations to focus on incidents that occur 
on or around military installations and fund its operation. This funding can include 
overtime for officers from local law enforcement agencies or funding for new, additional 
positions within those local law enforcement agencies that can work predominantly or 
exclusively on DOD-related law enforcement matters. This shared services model benefits 
the DOD as it takes advantage of concurrent jurisdiction through greater utilization of local 
law enforcement for incidents on military installations as well as those that occur outside 
military installations. This is more relevant as the majority of military service members 
assigned to a military installation live in the communities surrounding the military 
installation. Depending upon the size and location of the military installation, this can 
include multiple cities and counties. Since military service members do not exclusively 
commit the crime or are victims of crime on a military installation, having such as task 
force would also facilitate the leveraging of resources of those task force members from 
the law enforcement agencies of those municipalities. This allows the DOD and the local 
law enforcement agencies where service members live and work to share the load of 
policing and investigating matters where military service members are offenders or where 
the service members are victims and the offenders are civilians with no affiliation to the 
military. Additionally, such a shared service model may permit the DOD to devote less 
personnel, which in turn lowers cost, while achieving the same or better service delivery. 
However, the DOD’s existing strategies are barriers to implementing shared services via a 
task force by the DOD. As previously discussed, DOD’s strategy writ large is to support 
others in law enforcement, not lead any law enforcement effort not explicitly connected to 
homeland defense. However, the DOD could create a version of its Joint Task Force-North 
(JTF-N) with local law enforcement agencies to remain true to its law enforcement support 
strategies. Based at Fort Bliss, Texas, JTF-N is a joint service command comprised of 
active-duty and reserve-component Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, 
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DOD civilian employees, and contracted support personnel “tasked to support the nation’s 
federal law enforcement agencies in the identification and interdiction of suspected 
transnational criminal organizations’ activities conducted within and along the approaches 
to the continental U.S.” (JTF-N, n.d.). JTF-N has been in existence for over 30 years and 
is a DOD-led task force, but is only for homeland defense. Additionally, JTF-N 
membership is exclusively comprised of federal law enforcement agencies; not local law 
enforcement agencies like the above-mentioned task force model. 
Utilizing intra-agency shared services between the DOD and local law enforcement 
agencies will also reduce overlap and duplication—two areas the GAO is statutorily 
required to examine in how federal departments execute their functions. GAO defines 
overlap occurs when multiple agencies are engaged in similar activities for the same 
recipients. Next, duplication occurs when multiple agencies provide similar activities and 
services to the same beneficiary. Currently, some MCIOs conduct parallel investigations 
with local law enforcement agencies that involve military service members or related 
personnel such as military dependents when they are offenders or victims. The purported 
purpose of this is to ensure the military commander is informed and able to execute their 
responsibility of ensuring good order and discipline per the UCMJ. A secondary purpose 
is to provide the support requested by local law enforcement agencies and ensure the MCIO 
is prepared to assume the investigation if the local law enforcement agency ceases its 
investigation or their investigation is declined for the prosecution at the state level—in 
which case the MCIO will assume primary control to pursue prosecution under the UCMJ. 
In a DOD-led task force model, the MCIO and the local law enforcement agency will 
conduct investigations as a unified team instead of via two separate endeavors. That means 
one investigation instead of two which in turn, at a minimum, halves personnel conducting 
the investigation. Therefore, utilizing a shared service model for acquisition streamlines 
the task force and removes both overlap and duplication. 
d. Interdepartmental Shared Services 
In the FY 2021 Annual Performance Plan & FY 19 Annual  Performance Report 
(2020), the former OCMO used the phrase shared services approximately 35 times in the 
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plan. The former OCMO was abundantly clear in its intention to utilize shared services 
including, but not limited to, the elimination of duplication, reduction of administrative and 
regulatory burden, provision of data management and analytics for data-driven decision-
making, and improvement of customer experience. Given the short, three-year time the 
OCMO and CMO had to implement shared services in an enterprise fashion, before 
dissolution the objective of shared services at scale in the Department has yet to be realized. 
However, market research revealed the existence of shared services in other federal 
departments and agencies. This research will highlight and discuss the Department of 
Commerce (DOC) use of enterprise-wide services to provide insight to shape Step 5—
“Define the Acquisition Strategy”—within the “Develop” phase of the service acquisition 
process.  
The DOC took an enterprise services approach to shared services in 2018, utilizing 
“enterprise services to improve experience and consistency of services across the 
organization” (DOC, 2020). The DOC studied current enterprise operations through focus 
groups, studies, and interviews which identified three pain points in current service 
delivery across the 12 and very distinct bureaus of the DOC. Two of the three pain points 
discovered during the study included inefficient purchasing process and issues with IT 
services—two of the four services the DOC considers mission-enabling. The two key 
components of enterprise services cited by the DOC, based on previously stated research 
on DOD culture appear to make enterprise services palatable for the DOD. According to 
the DOC (2020), there were two key components to its enterprise services model: 
Independence from any particular DOC bureau and the provision of a subset 
of services deemed fit for delivery in a shared way. In general, services that 
are more transactional. Retaining some specific services in DOC bureaus 
which allows services that are more strategic and mission focused to remain 
closely linked to a bureau itself. (DOC, 2020) 
Military departments and their respective organizations are sensitive to perceived 
encroachment of their independence to procure their products and services. The second key 
component mentioned above would allow the military departments the autonomy to 
acquire those products and services that are particular and peculiar to their mission 
requirements while the first key component provides the centralization and standardization 
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that can generate economies of scale for shared services and products. Therefore, DOD law 
enforcement products and services may be procured according to the first key component 
as virtually all law enforcement products and services are capable of delivery in a shared 
way. According to the DOC (2020), benefits of enterprise services included advanced 
customer experience through “efficient delivery of high-quality services and access to real-
time information and service; increased performance management through increased 
transparency and accountability for meeting service standards allowing for informed 
decision-making and quick issue resolution; strengthened mission focus by freeing up 
employees to allocate their time to strategic activities as opposed to transactional tasks.” 
The Fourth Estate recently moved to enterprise services for many of its agencies for 
network, cloud, and other IT services. An enterprise services model, if not adopted by the 
Department as a whole, is still a viable solution for DOD law enforcement. Using existing 
infrastructure in the Fourth Estate, the DOD’s law enforcement organizations could 
establish their enterprise services model utilizing category management as its principle 
instrument. Further discussion on DOD law enforcement enterprise services is discussed 
in Chapter IV (Conclusion & Recommendations).  
4. STEP 4—DEFINE REQUIREMENTS 
Following the market research, the fourth step in the service acquisition process is 
defining the requirements of the acquisition. The findings gathered within the market are 
what assist in forming the requirements. “Requirements definition is the most important 
and most difficult part of services acquisition” (DAG, 2013). One mission of defining 
requirements is to ensure that they are understood by all stakeholders. In this section, a 
discussion of requirements for DOD law enforcement will occur that will highlight the 
acquisition associated with the requirements. 
a. Personnel  
Title 10 of the USC gives the SECDEF authority, direction, and control over all 
organizations of the DOD, including their personnel and property. It requires the SECDEF 
to protect the buildings, grounds, and property that are under the jurisdiction, custody, or 
control of the Department of Defense and the persons on that property (NDAA, 2016). This 
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essentially requires the SECDEF to perform law enforcement and designate the personnel 
to perform that service.   
As previously stated in this research, the DOD utilizes military service members 
and civilian personnel to perform law enforcement services. The DOD acquires military 
service members through recruitment and acquires civilian personnel in a similar, but 
distinct manner. Despite the differences in recruiting and on boarding military service 
members civilians, both are engaged in a pseudo-contract with the DOD. Both military and 
civilian personnel agree to provide a service to the DOD in exchange for consideration in 
the form of salary and benefits. For military members, particularly enlisted service 
members, this is typically an initial, fixed service obligation that’s normally four years in 
duration—similar to a period of performance in a procurement contract. Enlisted military 
service members can extend their service obligation if their performance and conduct are 
satisfactory, through re-enlisting in their military service—similar to option years in 
procurement contracts. Commissioned officers and civilians are not under contract, but do 
have a similar commitment.  
As with any acquisition best value to the DOD is a critical factor. An advantage 
military service members possess, when compared to hiring civilians, is that their level of 
training in certain skills is superior to that of a civilian. While military service members 
are or can be trained to perform any law enforcement function a civilian can perform, they 
are subject matter experts in the area of combat. As previously mentioned in this research, 
DOD law enforcement is a combat support service that can require performance in combat 
or contingency environments. This provides military service members a wider range of 
experience overall compared to a civilian. When deployed in a combat or contingency 
environment, military service members are dual-purpose as they can perform law 
enforcement and combat functions, unlike civilians who are largely single-purpose in the 
same environment. However, most of the military departments seem to require civilian 
police officers to supplement their military police officers. Operations Enduring Freedom 
and Iraqi Freedom highlighted the combat support role of military police. With active duty 
and reserve military police deployed to combat zones, the military departments had to rely 
on civilian personnel to fill the gap in manpower and to provide continuity for installation-
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level law enforcement. As a result, each military department maintains a robust population 
of civilian police officers who work in tandem with their military police counterparts.  
On the surface, military service members provide better value to the DOD for law 
enforcement when compared to civilians. In addition, to have additional capacity, military 
service members have a lower cost as they advance in their careers when compared to 
civilians. This is particularly relevant when comparing enlisted military service members 
and civilians. However, the best value determination requires an examination of tradeoffs. 
While military service members typically have a lower per-unit cost, civilian employees 
usually perform law enforcement more consistently and over longer periods than military 
service members. Further examination of this dynamic is outside the scope of this research 
but is suggested as an area for further study. 
b. Training 
In addition to delegating authority to military and civilian personnel of the DOD 
for law enforcement, Title 10 of the USC also provides the SECDEF the authority to carry 
firearms, make arrests, serve subpoenas, and execute warrants to fulfill the SECDEF’s 
inherent law enforcement responsibilities. The Service Secretaries utilize the SECDEF’s 
delegated power, as well as the authority of their authority under Title 10, to authorize 
military and civilian personnel of their respective Services to perform the above-mentioned 
functions. Additionally, commanders of military installations have inherent authority 
through power delegated from the SECDEF for the functions mentioned above. As a result 
of the functions required to perform, law enforcement services, the DOD is required to 
train its law enforcement personnel to standards set forth by various certifying and 
accrediting bodies. Military and civilian personnel normally have different training 
programs, but law enforcement training is one area where training is centralized, but not 
consolidated. This prevents the DOD from realizing cost savings through more efficient 
acquisitions through increased shared services or outsourcing.  
Military service members start their careers completing initial military training 
known as boot camp conducted by their respective military services where they obtain 
familiarization of the roles of their military service and receive basic combat skills. This 
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does not include law enforcement training. This typically occurs later in military service 
members’ careers after they’ve obtained training and experience in another, sometimes 
unrelated skill. However, law enforcement training is an area where the DOD can improve 
its acquisition by standardizing and consolidating training. This is discussed further in 
Chapter V (Conclusion & Recommendations). 
Civilian personnel in DOD law enforcement receive their training at civilian-
operated training academies rather than boot camps. For example, the vast majority of 
DOD law enforcement personnel receive their initial training law enforcement training at 
the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC)—a DHS-operated facility. The 
DOD, in essence, outsources training to the DHS for its civilian personnel. However, there 
is one DOD law enforcement organization within a military department that attends initial 
training at FLETC—the AFOSI. All other military service law enforcement organizations 
train at the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS). This fragmented training 
environment increases costs by dividing training between different locations and by having 
each DOD law enforcement organization administer the contracts, agreements, payments, 
etc., to these training facilities for their respective programs; all of which have varying 
costs. Additional discussion on this matter occurs in Chapter IV (Conclusions & 
Recommendations).  
Civilian personnel in DOD law enforcement receive their training at civilian-
operated training academies rather than boot camps. For example, the vast majority of 
DOD law enforcement personnel receive their initial training law enforcement training at 
the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC)—a DHS-operated facility. The 
DOD, in essence, outsources training to the DHS for its civilian personnel. However, there 
is one DOD law enforcement organization within a military department that attends initial 
training at FLETC—the AFOSI. All other military service law enforcement organizations 
train at the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS). This fragmented training 
environment increases costs by dividing training between different locations and by having 
each DOD law enforcement organization administer the contracts, agreements, payments, 
etc., to these training facilities for their respective programs; all of which have varying 
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costs. Additional discussion on this matter occurs in Chapter IV (Conclusions & 
Recommendations).  
c. Products and Services 
To perform its law enforcement services, DOD law enforcement personnel require 
equipment that is unique and specific to executing law enforcement functions. As 
previously discussed, DOD law enforcement requires a CMS to effectively execute 
functions related to investigations, incident management, data analysis, and information 
sharing with stakeholders inside and outside the Department. Such systems also require 
sustainment which may occur via a service. In addition to a CMS, DOD law enforcement 
requires other systems that to execute law enforcement functions that include forensics, 
biometrics, and other critical areas that are necessary to identify individuals associated with 
both criminal and intelligence matters. However, forensics and biometrics are considered 
a separate enterprise, from law enforcement because it is conducted in a decentralized and 
siloed manner that prevents standardization to occur. It is also needed to leverage category 
management to increase acquisition efficiency and decrease costs.   
Another important service is information technology (IT) as provides operational, 
sustainment, including long-distance communication and commercial satellite 
communications services, using both commercial and military exclusive IT equipment. 
This service also includes National Security Systems which is required for daily work 
performance that is unique CI and CT aspects of law enforcement. IT-based services such 
as cloud services, Infrastructure-as-a-Service, Platform-as-a-Service, Software-as-a-
Service, and other services are required to perform law enforcement functions such as data 
analysis and information sharing. This service is needed to carry out important day-to-day 
business operations. The acquisition of this service provides an opportunity to increase 
productivity that will in turn improve effectiveness and efficiency in the performance of 
law enforcement services within the DOD. While general IT requirements such as desktop 
computers, printers, etc., are provided to DOD law enforcement personnel through their 
respective military departments and defense agencies, their unique law enforcement IT 
products are services are procured in the same decentralized, inefficient, and costly manner.  
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Military and civilian law enforcement personnel of the DOD are issued specific law 
enforcement tools and equipment for protection and defense. These include, but are not 
limited to, firearms, ammunition, handcuffs, baton, body armor, vehicles, and additional 
equipment and protective gear as required by function and location. The government 
provides vehicles for personnel conducting official business, most of which are leased 
through the General Service Administration (GSA) who provides federal agencies with 
vehicles through fleet management services. Other common products utilized by DOD law 
enforcement personnel include, but are not limited to mobile computers such as laptops 
and tablets and cellular phones to execute law enforcement functions outside of an office 
and in varying conditions and environments at various times of day and night.      
5. STEP 5—DEVELOP ACQUISITION STRATEGY 
“The acquisition strategy document contains sufficient detail to allow senior 
leadership and the Service Category Decision Authority to assess whether the strategy 
makes good business sense, effectively implements laws and policies, and reflects 
management’s priorities, including affordability” (DAG, 2013). While this research is not 
creating a formal strategy document, this section will use the analysis provided in 
proceeding sections to present options for reform of DOD law enforcement based on 
acquisition strategy. This chapter will utilize a previous study of the subject matter as a 
guide in developing options for reform in DOD law enforcement.  
According to its report titled Report of the Advisory Board on the Investigative 
Capability of the Department of Defense, The Board (1995) found what it described as 
significant shortcomings the DOD should quickly remedy. In its report, the board provided 
nine areas that required remedy by the DOD. Four of those nine areas remain deficient and 
are areas of improvement for the DOD’s policing and investigative capabilities. The four 
outstanding areas are listed below: 
1. Leadership 
2. Consolidation 
3. Data Collection and Analysis 
4. Training 
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The proceeding sections and sub-sections will address four of the above-mentioned 
shortcomings identified by The Board. However, despite the fact there are four 
shortcomings, this research will address all of them through two of the identified 
shortcomings—leadership and consolidation. All of these shortcomings can all be surmised 
through challenges in DOD leadership and the continued need for consolidation—
particularly in the area of acquisition. In doing so, shortcomings identified in this research 
are compared and contrasted with those of The Board to generate options for reform based 
on contemporary information.  
a. Leadership  
The most poignant shortcoming identified by The Board (1995) states that 
uniformly professional and efficient investigative capability will remain an elusive goal 
unless the [SECDEF] gives it his attention. While The Board’s statement refers to 
investigations, the same applies to police functions in the DOD. The attention of the 
SECDEF is required to initiate any reform effort to improve effectiveness and efficiency 
in the performance and administration of DOD law enforcement. As discussed earlier in 
this research, the law requires the DOD to execute law enforcement functions and to do so 
efficiently. It also provides the SECDEF the authority to make broad, sweeping changes 
per the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. However, as the CEO of the largest federal 
department, significant and consistent levels of SECDEF involvement are virtually 
impossible. In its report, The Board (1995) highlights this by stating:  
Ultimately, the [SECDEF] is responsible for all of these investigations, but 
he cannot be expected to focus on the myriad of policy issues that regularly 
arise. The Secretary must be able to rely on members of his management 
team to develop and implement investigative policies in those areas that 
transcend the parochial interests of any given Service. And, he needs the 
active cooperation of the Services themselves. 
As demonstrated by the MFT discussed in Step 1 (Form the Team) of the service 
acquisition process, there are 17 managers for the SECDEF to rely upon. While the 
numbers suggest there’s a robust team to assist the SECDEF, there is no single individual 
responsible for all matters of law enforcement in the DOD. The Board (1995) stated the 
organizational structure now existing within the OSD does not lend itself to giving the 
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SECDEF a coordinated mechanism to fulfill the law enforcement responsibilities of the 
Department—particularly investigations. The organizational structure that existed in 1995 
at the time of The Board’s report still exists today, with no significant reform in the almost 
30 years since the publication of The Board’s report. The current structure does not allow 
for effective management of a key enterprise function and obfuscates any form of 
accountability for the effectiveness and efficiency of such a critical, enterprise-wide 
function. Additionally, the decentralized structure does not allow the transcendence of 
parochial interests by the military departments. The current structure in which the Service 
Secretaries, two Undersecretaries, and the IG DOD are responsible for law enforcement 
and associated acquisitions without central management, does not adequately serve the 
SECDEF. The SECDEF must have one senior official to lead a new Defense Law 
Enforcement Enterprise (DLEE) within the DOD. 
(1) Central Manager for DOD Law Enforcement 
This research and history have shown that central management of enterprise-wide 
functions under one entity outside of the military departments generates efficiencies and 
greater performance the military departments cannot deliver. The DOD utilizes an 
“Executive Agent” model for addressing Department-wide functions. According to DODD 
5101.1 titled DOD Executive Agent (2003), an Executive Agent (EA) is defined as “the 
Head of a DOD Component to whom the SECDEF or the DEPSECDEF has assigned 
specific responsibilities, functions, and authorities to provide defined levels of support for 
operational missions, or administrative or other designated activities that involve two or 
more of the DOD Components” (p. 2). Many of the Fourth Estate DAFAs was created as 
a result of the ineffectiveness of the EA system’s predecessor for central management. For 
example, after Congress created the DOD in the late 1940s, the military departments split 
the provision of common articles among themselves (Williamson, 2019). This was referred 
to as the single manager system in which a single military department would acquire a 
commodity for all of the DOD. While consolidation under the single manager system might 
theoretically enable efficiencies, the lack of standardized documentation, receipt, and order 
processing systems forced the units had to manage separate and parallel procedures for 
each of the three military departments (Williamson, 2019). Therefore, the single 
57 
management system, which is equivalent to today’s EA system, did not realize the 
efficiencies it was intended to create. Central management outside the military departments 
was required to achieve the efficiencies and savings gained from the consolidation that was 
not possible through the military departments. In his 2019 article titled Consolidation of 
Supply Functions Under the Defense Logistics Agency Brought Efficiencies, Cost Savings 
to DOD Logistics, Williamson makes the following points in highlighting the success of 
central management in a DAFA compared to the single manager system like the EA system 
that relies upon the Services:  
• Found efficiencies through consolidation, standardization, structure, and 
emphasis 
• Did not accept personnel from the Services whose jobs would be 
duplicated under the new structure 
• Reduced inventory by cutting supplies and warehouses 
• Eliminated layers between the DOD and commodity managers 
• Increased the emphasis on automation, workforce management, and value 
engineering 
• Centralized supply functions under one agency allowed for data 
automation 
Therefore, central leadership and management are critical to creating the standardization 
and structure needed to gain efficiencies in acquisition. Another benefit of central 
management outside the Services is economies of scale and reductions personnel which 
provides savings in addition to those generated through standardization. 
The DLA example demonstrates the need for acquisition in a DLEE to occur 
outside the Services where they remain decentralized and lack standardization to be 
effective. Full acquisition authority, direction, and control of a DLEE must be provided to 
a central manager. Congress could bestow similar acquisition authority to that granted to 
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the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) upon its inception as established by the Joint 
Resolution of Congress in 1986: 
• To validate and establish priorities for requirements; 
• Ensure combat readiness; 
• Develop and acquire special operations--peculiar equipment and 
acquire special 
• operations--peculiar material, supplies, and services; and 
• Ensure the interoperability of equipment and forces 
Similar to SOCOM’s functions, the performance of law enforcement requires unique 
equipment and services. As a result, a DLEE would need to validate and establish priorities 
for its unique requirements. This is particularly true for IT services unique to law 
enforcement, such as CMS and digital evidence management systems. A DLEE central 
manager will not need to develop peculiar equipment like law enforcement equipment 
needs are available via the commercial market. Despite the commercial availability of such 
equipment, it peculiar within military departments as they are not routinely found in the 
inventory of such departments. Even protective equipment such as ballistic vests specific 
to law enforcement personnel is different than those acquired and issued through military 
department acquisition channels for combat. Peculiar equipment needs for a DLEE include, 
but are not limited to, vehicles with emergency response equipment such as sirens, mobile 
digital terminal (MDTs) for patrol vehicles, specific law enforcement clothing such as raid 
jackets, audio/visual recording equipment for suspect and victim interviews, and forensics 
tools and supplies for a crime scene examination. Additionally, a DLEE has peculiar 
service needs such as transcription services and various types of analytical support, that, 
while similar to those of military intelligence, are still distinct from those used in law 
enforcement. 
(2) Utilizing Category Management in DOD Law Enforcement Acquisition 
The current structure of DOD law enforcement does not allow for category 
management that could occur under a DLEE with a central manager. “Category 
management, at its most basic level, category management is about bundling items” 
(Webb, 2015), and is an “approach the federal government [applies] to buy smarter and 
more like a single enterprise” (DAU, n.d.). Category management enables the government 
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to group products or services by type and acquire them under a single contract (Webb, 
2015), enabling them to “eliminate redundancies, increase efficiency, and deliver more 
value and savings from the government’s acquisition programs” (DAU, n.d.) provides the 
example below that highlight what occurs when an organization does not use category 
management to acquire similar items required across the enterprise: 
Imagine a company with 40 factories, spread across the world. Each has a 
general manager (GM) responsible for negotiating her own deals for supply. 
Let’s take paperclips. Each GM spends time trying to source stationery 
which, although not essential to the factory, subsumes time in sourcing. 
Suppliers know that the GMs are busy and looking to close a quick deal. 
Vendors can take advantage of this and push for a higher price in return for 
a fast turnaround. They can repeat this trick 40 times, as GMs across the 
companies do not waste time discussing the price of paperclips.  
A 2013 audit titled Police Procurement in England and Wales by the National Audit Office 
covering 43 police forces across England and Wales found that procurement activity at the 
police force level developed organically, with police forces historically procuring most 
goods and services independently. Therefore, each police historically procured items 
without utilizing category management. The National Audit Office (2013) elaborated by 
stating the following: 
We examined police forces’ procurement of five categories of goods, such 
as body [armor] and riot shields. For each category we found they procure 
a wide range of different specifications. Even for identical goods, we found 
substantial variation in the prices paid. 
The results of the National Audit Office’s audit are indicative of current acquisition 
practices in DOD law enforcement. Currently, all law enforcement peculiar equipment and 
services are procured individually by the Services. Even within the Services, law 
enforcement acquisition is not unified. For example, an MCIO can have different 
equipment than the military police or security forces of their same Service. While there are 
instances where requirements are different, they are largely common to all MCIOs and 
military police or security forces. The above-cited audit is a follow-up to a previous audit 
related to police procurement in England and Wales. In its 2011 consultation paper titled 
Obtaining Better Value for Money from Police Procurement the Home Department (Home 
Office) stated “as the taxpayer expects improvements in value for money, it is no longer 
60 
defensible to continue a system where goods and services for policing are bought in up to 
43 different ways across the country.” The same sentiment applies to DOD law 
enforcement acquisition. 
b. Consolidation 
The topic of consolidation is an area of focus for reform in the DOD to realize the 
establishment of a DLEE. Within this section, the consolidation of MCIO office space for 
co-location, the law of IT and other technical products and services; and consolidation of 
law enforcement training for co-location are discussed.  
The Conference Report of the NDAA for FY 1993 referenced a bill drafted in the 
House of Representatives that contained a provision (sec. 902) that would require the 
SECDEF to consolidate in the DCIS the functions of the USACID, the NCIS, and the 
AFOSI. However, the Senate’s amendment contained a provision that required the 
SECDEF to establish a commission to examine DOD law enforcement. The House of 
Representatives receded its provision and The Board was subsequently established. 
However, The Board concluded that consolidation of the DCIOs would not improve the 
investigative capability of the DOD. The Board (1995) also concluded that cost savings 
associated with such consolidation are “unreliable” and the costs of consolidation from a 
customer service standpoint are not worth estimated financial costs savings—
approximately $65.8 million of five years in 1994 figures according to the DOD 
Comptroller at the time.  
Although no savings are insignificant, particularly in times of budget reductions, 
The Board (1995) believed that whatever savings would occur were insufficient to warrant 
the reported reduction in quality and responsiveness that would accompany consolidation. 
However, there is value in each Service maintaining its MCIO. The Board (1995) 
recommends against total consolidation because it concluded from its findings that the 
military services need their own general crimes investigators and complete consolidation 
would create an overly large and unresponsive organization. It did not, however, state the 
same for CI and CT. Additionally, since Cyber was not a prevalent area in law enforcement 
at the time of The Board’s report in 1995, it too was not studied for consolidation. However, 
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the consolidation or central management of CI, CT, and Cyber, from a law enforcement 
standpoint in the DOD, are areas of further study. In addition to finding no significant 
problems with the current organizational structure for conducting general crimes 
investigations, The Board (1995) also concluded that investigators who know the culture 
in which they are investigating and who are trained to deploy with their Services conduct 
higher quality general crimes investigations. However, The Board and the GAO agree that 
procurement fraud is an area where consolidation into a single agency is appropriate. While 
staying within the construct of each military department maintaining its own MCIO, there 
is an area of consolidation that maintains MCIO independence, but also allows for greater 
shared services—MCIO office space; data collection and analysis; and initial and advanced 
training.  
(1) Shared Services for DOD Law Enforcement Office Space 
The Department is one of the largest real property managers in the world, 
maintaining inventory in all 50 states, seven U.S. territories, and 42 foreign countries  
with over three billion square feet of owned and leased facilities valued at over one trillion 
dollars while costing $30 billion annually for maintenance and upkeep (Defense Business 
Board, 2016). Through the Defense Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process,  
the DOD has sought to consolidate and reduce its real estate holdings to increase efficiency 
and generate cost savings. Another round of BRAC is needed to evaluate the benefit of 
shared services of MCIO office space. There is demonstrated value in such consolidation 
as a prior BRAC round recommended the co-location of MCIO headquarters elements, 
along with other security and intelligence entities, in a single location. This 
recommendation was implemented and today USACID, NCIS, AFOSI, and the Defense 
Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) are headquartered in the same building 
as the Joint Counterintelligence Training Academy (JCITA)—a subordinate unit of the 
DIA—in a consolidated facility aboard Marine Corps Base Quantico, VA. According to 




• Annual savings of $25.7 million within seven years of initial investment 
• Produce operational synergies by collocating entities with similar or 
related missions  
• Enhanced security for DOD activities and consolidation of NCR 
intelligence community activities for the DOD 
• Significantly enhance CI synchronization and collaboration across the 
DOD 
• Enhance DOD analytic and operational synergy and cooperation 
However, some but not all of the above-mentioned benefits were realized by co-location. 
The construction costs of the building almost doubled due to increased costs in military 
construction, as well as inadequate requirements definition. In 2012, in a GAO report titled 
Military Base Realignments and Closures, Lepore stated, “the one-time implementation 
costs increased $301 million (175 percent) largely because the required square footage 
needed for the facility was underestimated” because “space for contractors or students that 
train at the facility was not originally included.” However, despite these issues, 
consolidation of office space that leads to co-location of MCIOs has the potential to yield 
cost savings as similar efforts, such as the consolidation of civilian personnel offices within 
military department and defense agencies and the co-location of missile and space defense 
agencies at Redstone Arsenal, AL, which saved $87.8 million and $118.2 million  
(Lepore, 2021)   
MCIOs have offices on their respective installations. However, there are military 
installations, particularly joint bases established through BRAC Commissions, where 
multiple Services occupy real estate on one installation. As a result, based on the number 
of personnel assigned to or assets located at a joint base, an MCIO may establish an office 
at that location. Therefore, there are locations where more than one MCIO has established 
an office but maintains that office separate and apart from the other MCIO(s). For example, 
in locations such as Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling in Washington, DC, and Joint Base San 
Antonio in Texas, the MCIOs maintain separate buildings on the same installation. 
Consolidating office space and co-locating the MCIOs may assist in realizing some of the 
previously mentioned benefits identified by the 2005 BRAC Commission. However, 
consolidating office space to co-locate MCIOs is an area of further study as it will require 
an initial investment and a time before cost savings will occur. Further study such as a cost-
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benefit analysis is needed to determine if such consolidation will result in long-term 
savings.  
If consolidation of office space is deemed beneficial, the MCIOs can institute a 
shared services model where costs for initial building construction or renovation as well as 
contract management are shared between the MCIOs. Additionally, the MCIOs could use 
shared services to defray the costs of facility maintenance, waste removal, and other 
services usually paid via contract. For example, the DOD could implement a system where 
MCIOs contribute to shared facility services similar to the International Cooperative 
Administrative Support Services (ICASS) system the DOD participates in abroad when 
DOD personnel are assigned to at U.S. embassies and consulates of the Department of State 
(DOS). “ICASS is an interagency system established in 1997 for distributing the cost of 
administrative services at overseas posts and is intended to ensure that each agency bears 
the cost of its overseas presence” (Courts, 2012). MCIOs that maintain separate offices on 
the same military installation are potentially duplicating acquisition costs in the 
construction or renovation of these offices and the services to maintain them. This increases 
overall costs to the DOD. “GAO’s analysis of ICASS cost and workload data shows that 
significant economies of scale can be achieved through greater participation in ICASS” 
(Courts, 2012). However, while participation in the ICASS system is voluntary, it is 
required for certain services at a DOS embassy or consulate. The voluntary nature of 
participation in some but not all services contributes to duplication as agencies make 
decisions on ICASS participation based on their costs and not the total cost to the 
Government. Additionally, agencies may obtain their services without comparing costs. 
Therefore, if the DOD were to implement an ICASS-type system with co-located MCIOs, 
mandatory participation is required with oversight from a central manager within the DOD.  
A second reason why the intended benefits of headquarters co-location were not 
realized is that, despite working in the same building, the MCIOs still do not have an 
effective and efficient way to share information for collaboration and de-duplication. While 
co-location has increased dialogue and cooperation at the leadership levels, realizing 
greater synchronization and analytical synergy has remained elusive due to siloed data 
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collection. This is an even larger problem in locations where MCIOs are geographically 
separated or even tenants on the same installation.  
As previously stated in this research, none of the CMS of the DCIOs are integrated 
to provide a common operating picture for the DOD. Each MCIO and policing organization 
in the DOD maintains its own CMS that feeds incident and investigation data to central 
DOD databases that serve as data repositories. The Board (1995) addressed this issue in its 
report through its examination of what is called automated data processing by stating the 
following: 
The capability to gather and analyze at the DOD level the enormous amount 
of data related to DOD investigations—much less do it quickly—is virtually 
nonexistent. At last count, 23 different, incompatible database systems exist 
within DOD to gather and archive data on investigations, law enforcement 
activities, prosecutive activities, and confinement records. Although the 
[SECDEF] has directed the Department to standardize and integrate DOD 
automated data processing (ADP) systems, DOD has not yet linked these 
databases to permit quick retrieval of data for useful management analysis. 
Despite direction by the SECDEF to standardize and integrate law enforcement systems 
before or concurrent with The Board’s report in 1995, the DOD has still not followed 
through with this direction almost 30 years later. Despite receiving this information from 
The Board, Congress has contributed, along with various SECDEFs, to the fragmentation 
and duplication in incompatible and non-integrated law enforcement systems by not 
executing on recommendations from The Board and by appropriating funds for duplicative 
systems. Stein (2019) stated, in regard to Air Force Justice Information System, that an Air 
Force team developed AFJIS within 10 months for $5.7 million. Assuming each DCIO 
spent the same amount for their CMS, the DOD would have spent over $25 million for 
multiple systems that provide similar capabilities, are not interoperable, do not share data, 
do not share criminal intelligence, and do not allow for DOD-wide analytics of law 
enforcement incidents and investigations. While a CMS may optimally address the needs 
of a particular DCIO or police organization, it does not address the needs of the DOD as a 
whole. This does not provide the best value for the DOD for multiple reasons including, 
but not limited to, inefficient acquisition, duplicative contract costs, no system integration 
to eliminate data silos, and no common operating picture for the SECDEF on law 
65 
enforcement activities of the Department. Despite this fact, in the year 2021, there are 
currently two MCIOs developing a new CMS for their needs independent of each other 
thereby duplicating costs for the DOD. Additionally, the two systems are not interoperable 
and will not permit information sharing between the two MCIOs.  
(2) Shared Services and Outsourcing of DOD Law Enforcement Training 
The DOD can also reduce costs through increased shared services and outsourcing 
training of the DCIOs and police organizations of the Department. While some 
organizations have joint training courses and facilities to reduce costs through shared 
services, there are additional savings that are achievable particularly in uncertain fiscal 
environments. As with the period in which The Board’s study was completed and as it 
exists today, defense budgets face flattening and declines. Therefore, in these days of DOD 
downsizing, the duplication in schoolhouse facilities, instructor and support staff, and 
equipment, to teach the same subjects to new investigators is not only unnecessary but also 
inefficient (The Board, 1995). The decentralized nature of DOD law enforcement training 
does not take advantage of existing economies of scale and also prevents the DOD from 
achieving its economies of scale through shared services. Table 10 lists the training 
locations of DOD law enforcement organizations. To add clarity to further discussion on 




Table 9. DOD Law Enforcement Training Locations 
ORGANIZATION TRAINING LOCATION 
Army 
  Army Police (military & civilian) 
  USACID 
  Army Military Intelligence 
 
U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) 
U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) 
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center 
(FLETC) 
Navy 
  Navy Security Forces (military) 
  Navy Police (civilian) 
  NCIS 
 
Naval Technical Training Center (NTTC) 
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center 
(FLETC) 
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center 
(FLETC) 
Air Force 
  Air Force Security Forces (military) 
  Air Force Police (civilian) 
  AFOSI 
 
Air Force Security Forces Center (AFSFC) 
Veterans Affairs Law Enforcement Training 
Center 
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center 
(FLETC) 
Marine Corps 
  Marine Corps Police (military & civilian) 
  Marine Corps CID 
 
U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) 
 
Fourth Estate 
  NSA Police 
  DIA Police 
  NGA Police 
  PFPA 
 





Federal Law Enforcement Training Center 
(FLETC) 
 
The names of training locations for basic police training may suggest each training 
program is in a different location. For example, despite having different names the AFSFC 
and the NTTC are both located at Lackland Air Force Base in Texas. However, while 
AFSFC and NTTC are located on the same installation, they are separate training programs. 
Therefore, while Navy Security Forces and Air Force Security Forces complete basic law 
enforcement training at the same installation and receive similar law enforcement training, 
the Air Force and the Navy incur costs of two separate training programs. This is unlike 
the Army and the Marine Corps whose military police attend the same basic military police 
training program at the USAMPS at Fort Leonard Wood in Missouri in a joint training 
environment. This provides the benefits of independence while capturing economies of 
scale by utilizing shared services. Army and Marine Corps military police trainees receive 
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instruction side-by-side while also receiving further instruction on military service-specific 
matters by instructors from their respective military services.  
The Marine Corps moved its Marine Corps Police Academy (MCPA) from Marine 
Corps Air Station Miramar in California to Fort Leonard Wood at the USAMPS to obtain 
cost savings and take advantage of economies of scale through shared services. The MCPA 
is the Marine Corp’s academy for its civilian police officers. According to Decker (2020), 
the “decision to move the [MCPA] serves a two-fold purpose first, saving the DOD $4.5 
million per year and second, giving students of the academy, which instructs civilian police 
serving Marine Corps installations, access to state-of-the-art training facilities at the 
[USAMPS].” Decker (2020) quoted Deputy Commanding General Gregg Thompson from 
the Support Center of Excellence at Fort Leonard Wood who said, “the academy will serve 
as another venue through which we can share both our land and resources with our 
interagency and our interservice partners.” However, while the move saved costs through 
shared services, additional savings are possible with taking shared services further by 
implementing a joint training program with all civilian and military police officers. If the 
Navy and the Air Force were to use the same shared service model as the Army and Marine 
Corps, cost savings and economies of scale realized by co-location of military and civilian 
police training programs are possible.  
Since the Fourth Estate is independent of a military department, it does not rely on 
the military department training programs to fulfill its requirements. Additionally, Fourth 
Estate police organizations are exclusively civilian in composition which also shapes these 
organizations’ training requirements. Additionally, they serve a predominantly civilian 
workforce when compared to military police. Therefore, police organizations of the Fourth 
Estate utilize FLETC. 
Like training for basic police, training for basic investigations is also spread across 
more than one location; though not to the same degree. While all MDCOs train at FLETC, 
not all the DCIOs utilize FLETC for basic investigations training. USACID is the only 
DCIO that does not utilize FLETC for its training. Instead, USACID utilizes the USAMPS. 
While NCIS and AFOSI receive the same basic investigations training through FLETC 
along with other federal law enforcement agencies such as U.S. Secret Service and the U.S. 
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Marshals Service, USACID attends the same basic investigations course as USMC-CID—
an agency that is not an MCIO. While NCIS and AFOSI build on the basic investigations 
training at FLETC with “add-on” training provided by their respective agencies, USACID 
does not have add-on training upon completion of its basic investigations program.  
Training for add-on and advanced training for investigations is also predominantly 
attended at FLETC. However, the USACID does not send its military agents to attend any 
FLETC courses and only sends their civilian agents that conduct procurement fraud to 
attend advanced training courses at FLETC. While follow-on training for NCIS and AFOSI 
is held at FLETC, both agencies maintain separate training programs. While this is also 
true for DCIS, its follow-on training requirements differ since it is under the authority, 
direction, and control of the IG DOD. DCIS agents must attend specific training for IGs 
that is held at FLETC. However, DCIS attends much of the same advanced training at 
FLETC as does NCIS and AFOSI.  
Similar to police training, the DOD misses opportunities to capitalize on economies 
of scale through outsourcing much of its training to FLETC. Thereby, neglecting any 
potential cost savings as well as opportunities to achieve standardization required for the 
centralization of law enforcement systems to allow for more efficient acquisitions. The 
DOD must reduce fragmentation and overlap in its training for police and investigators. To 
realize additional savings through shared services, the DOD must consolidate its training 
through co-location. The Board (1995) stated in its report the biggest factor to be 
considered in consolidating basic training is identifying the best facility at which to train 
all DCIO investigators. The same applies to military and civilian personnel performing 




IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
A significant event, such as the attacks of 9/11, usually serves as the trigger for 
reform, reorganization, or consolidation. Therefore, “most successful reorganizations have 
also shared a common mission focus, usually responding to major mission failures or 
service delivery issues” (Executive Office of the President of the United States, 2018). The 
creation of the DHS and the position of the DNI are prime examples as they were created 
following the terrorist attacks of 9/11. For over a decade before 9/11, some members in 
Congress introduced legislation to create a DNI position. The DNI is, in essence, a central 
manager for the U.S. Intelligence Community much like the proposed central manager for 
a DLEE in the DOD. However, there was no impetus for reform as no mission failure or 
crisis occurred before 9/11 to stir the appetite for reform that resulted in the DNI. Despite 
numerous reports provided to SECDEFs of the past and Congress, the DOD has failed to 
address matters of DOD law enforcement acquisition.  
The DOD’s own service acquisition process can assist the DOD in its examination. 
In essence, law enforcement is a service utilized by the DOD. As with any service the DOD 
obtains, the service acquisition process ensures the DOD obtains what it needs at a fair and 
reasonable price. According to the DAG (2013), “services encompass all non-product 
procurements and involve the performance of specific activities in support of DOD 
missions.” As previously stated in this research, law enforcement in the DOD exists to 
support the mission of the department. Therefore, based on the DAG’s definition, law 
enforcement is indeed a service as it supports the DOD’s mission to maintain and use armed 
forces for timely and effective military action. While the DAG states the DOD does not 
typically own the assets performing the service, it states that product-like acquisitions such 
as professional services of a consulting firm that generate reports for the DOD are a form 
of service; though it’s harder to identify it as such (DAG, 2013). Law enforcement in the 
DOD, in many respects, is a professional service for the DOD. 
70 
The DOD has a decades-long history of using consolidation and centralization to 
obtain greater effectiveness and efficiency as previously discussed in this research. While 
some consolidation and centralization efforts were directed by law, the vast majority of 
consolidation and centralization of functions within the DOD was initiated and instituted 
by the DOD itself or by Congress. While the federal government has business processes, it 
is not a business in the true sense. However, injecting more business practice in decision-
making can achieve greater efficiency. Figure 3 uses a commercial business approach to 
determining whether centralization is appropriate for a business. This model is often used 
after one business has acquired another through a merger or acquisition to determine the 
path forward for the new business entity.  
 
Figure 3. Questions to Ask When Deciding Upon Centralization. 
Source: Campbell and Muller-Stewens (2011). 
At an initial glance, the answer to the first question may invoke a “No” response. 
However, as previously discussed in this research law and policy requires the SECDEF, 
DEPSECDEF, and the Service Secretaries to be responsible for the efficient operations of 
functions under their charge. Specifically, the law requires the SECDEF to provide 
statements of cost savings and the elimination of redundancies to Congress (10 USC § 113) 
as well as consolidate to provide more efficient and economical administration and 
operation of the DOD (10 USC § 125). While the law does not explicitly require the 
SECDEF to centralize elements of DOD law enforcement particularly, it explicitly requires 
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the SECDEF to apply that legal obligation to all areas of the DOD which includes law 
enforcement. This is particularly relevant as the previous discussion of legal authorities 
highlighted that every DOD law enforcement entity, those that perform police functions as 
well as those that perform investigative functions, all operate under the legal authority of 
the SECDEF.  
While market capitalization is not a concern of the DOD, it must determine if 
centralization will add value to the DOD. The answer to the second question is “Yes” 
because of the added value in the more efficient and effective acquisition and 
administration through centralization. Looking back at the previous examples of 
consolidation to realize centralization with DLA and DCMA, the DOD has proved through 
these and other Fourth Estate DAFAs that centralization adds value. The current effort to 
centralize MTF administration under DHA is one recent example as well as the 
consolidation of military exchanges to create centralization for the incorporation of 
category management. Therefore, the DOD recognizes the significant value afforded by 
continuing to centralize services within its DAFAs. For example, in 2020, the Defense 
Information Systems Agency (DISA) moved to consolidate and the IT networks of 
approximately 14 Fourth Estate agencies into one unified network. Miller (2019) cites 
Drew Jaehnig, Chief of the Fourth Estate Optimization Program as well as the Chief of the 
Defense Enclave Services Program, who stated “the Department thinks we should be able 
to save a significant amount of money and return that to the lethality for the Department 
by combining these networks and reducing the footprint to the tune of about $170 million 
a year.” This recent example within the Fourth Estate once again demonstrates that 
centralization adds significant value.  
The answer to the third question is arguably the most difficult to answer. First and 
foremost, there is the risk to almost any decision to centralize—particularly in bureaucracy-
laden institutions such as the DOD. Additionally, organizational inertia and a strong, 
sometimes misguided adherence to military department and DOD organizational culture 
that pride themselves on control, create noteworthy variables for the items of business 
rigidity and motivation. To what degree they impact risk is debatable and to an extent 
depends on those in the decision-making process. The Board, in essence, stated that any 
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effort to make change is impossible without SECDEF’s attention. Therefore, without the 
involvement of a SECDEF, who does not wait for or necessarily seek consensus and who 
effectively wields the power of the SECDEF under laws that empower the SECDEF to 
make sweeping change, there is potentially high risk. Centralization on a scale described 
in this research requires an engaged leader with the desire and authority to effect change. 
A leader can guide those reticent to change through the process and compel those who are 
not willing to change. If such an individual is at the helm of the effort, the risk lowers 
significantly. However, the individual(s) do not have to belong to the DOD. Congress has 
the authority through legislation to affect the necessary centralization. However, like the 
DOD, it can encounter significant business rigidity and can lack motivation without a crisis, 
significant event, and constituent interest to precipitate action which greatly increases the 
risk.  
The answer to the three questions of centralization does not warrant a categorical 
“No” across the board, which leads to the conclusion that centralization is not appropriate. 
The answers to questions one and two are dependent upon one’s point of view. The answer 
to the second question is undoubted “Yes.” Therefore, centralization is appropriate for 
DOD law enforcement. The significant value-added through centralization that will bring 
standardization increased shared services, and better buying power through category 
management far outweigh any possible “No” answers to the other two questions. 
Therefore, using acquisition strategy from a commercial business and Government 
procurement standpoint has shown that reform of DOD law enforcement is not only needed 
but required to move the DOD forward to increase effectiveness and efficiency to reinvest 
in the warfighter.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
First, the DOD must develop an enterprise-wide strategy for DOD law enforcement 
and ensure its alignment with national goals and objectives. As previously stated in this 
research, strategy impacts resource allocation which in turn impacts acquisition. The 
Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process in Figure 4 is used the 
generate its portion of the president’s budget requests to Congress. 
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Figure 4. Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) 
Process Overview. AcqNotes. Source: National Defense Strategy. 
Reprinted from the Planning Phase of the PPBE Process (2018).  
The first three items in the planning phase all pertain to strategy. Therefore, the 
DOD must ensure that law enforcement is appropriately aligned with all of those strategies. 
Additionally, it appears without tying DOD law enforcement to a relevant, national 
strategy, DOD law enforcement acquisition reform will not occur until a mission failure or 
other similar significant event.  
Finally, the DOD must establish a DLEE. The DOD clearly understands the value 
in such a designation as it has established a Defense Forensics Enterprise; a Defense 
Intelligence Enterprise; and a Defense Security Enterprise. However, rather than establish 
a DLEE, the DOD instead relies on fragmented delegation of the SECDEF’s authority and 
the imperfect EA system for assigning responsibility. The problem with such an approach 
is that it does not allow for a single individual to assume responsibility for a service like 
law enforcement that spans not only the Services but the Fourth Estate. As previously 
discussed in this research, DAFAs was established due to inherent weaknesses in the EA 
system. Additionally, law enforcement, similar to the SECDEF, is not the primary or 
secondary responsibility for the Service Secretaries. The Service Secretaries, by law, are 
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responsible for organizing, training, and equipping their military departments among many 
other tasks. While this research has stated this can include the functions and personnel 
associated with law enforcement, it is not viewed in that manner. Service Secretaries are 
primarily concerned with matters such as budgets, large acquisition programs, etc., of 
which law enforcement matters of their respective military services appear to rarely reach 
that level. Therefore, it’s not realistic, prudent, or fair to place full accountability of the 
effectiveness and efficiency of law enforcement of the military services squarely on the 
Service Secretaries. Therefore, a DLEE must be established with its leader to centralize the 
authority, direction, and control of the SECDEF for law enforcement responsibility. 
Establishing a dedicated law enforcement enterprise will reduce fragmentation, overlap, 
and duplication to healthy levels. It will also provide much-needed acquisition support to 
a decentralized law enforcement procurement system and will provide the SECDEF and 
Congress a true advisor and Senior Accountable Official in the DOD for law enforcement.  
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